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DECEMBER 10, 1944 — FEBRUARY 28, 1945 1

MARCH 1, 1945 — MARCH 31, 1945 18

APRIL 1, 1945 — APRIL 30, 1945 31

MAY 1, 1945 — MAY 31, 1945 47

JUNE 1, 1945 — JUNE 30, 1945 52

ORGANIZATION OF THE 86TH REGIMENT 53

CASUALTIES OF THE 86TH REGIMENT 54

ROLL OF HONOR OF THE 86TH REGIMENT 55

MAPS OF THE CAMPAIGN*

MAP 1. RIVA RIDGE 61

MAP 2. MT. BELVEDERE RIDGE 63

MAP 3. MARCH OFFENSIVE 65

MAP 4. SPRING OFFENSIVE 67

MAP 5. BREAKOUT 69

MAP 6. PO VALLEY SOUTH 71

MAP 7. PO RIVER CROSSING 73

MAP 8. ADVANCE TO LAKE GARDA 75

MAP 9. LAKE GARDA: THE FINAL BATTLES 77

*Maps are modified versions of the battle diagrams published by

Armand Casini in 1945.

he taciturn, almost sullen men of the U.S. Army Transportation Corps who checked the boat

rosters at the foot of the gangplank saw nothing different about the long lines of soldiers

moving past them. The American Red Cross ladies who served doughnuts and hot coffee had

seen hundreds of other men in the same uniforms, dragging the same clumsy duffle bags, wind

their way through the big shed and onto the waiting transports. To these men and women it was

all in the day’s work.

But to the men of the 86th Mountain Infantry, commanded by Colonel CLARENCE M.

TOMLINSON, it was a red-letter day—one they would never forget. After months of training in

the mountains of Colorado and in the hot Texas sun, they were headed overseas, the vanguard of

the 10th Mountain Division.

It had been a fast, unexpected movement. Jerked from a scarcely begun maneuver, the men

of the 86th had boarded trains at Camp Swift, Texas, and sped across the eastern United States to

Camp Patrick Henry, Virginia. There they had just had time enough to give equipment a lastminute

check and make those all-important phone calls home. Some optimistic souls bought lipstick

and soap at the Post Exchange—for possible barter purposes.

No one had much time to think that morning. It was the 10th of December 1944, and a cold

breeze swept across Hampton Roads. Every man was busy with his equipment. It was a mansized

job to handle the overloaded pack and duffle bag that each man carried, to say nothing of

the rifle, gas mask, and steel helmet. Somehow they managed to make it past the checker and up

the slanting plank to the deck of the SS Argentina, a former luxury liner on the Caribbean run.

Eventually each man found himself in a bunk and began to shed his equipment.

These bunks were to be home for the next two weeks. It was easy to see that the Argentina

was no longer a luxury liner. There was barely room to move between the tiers of beds that stood

in some places 10 and 12 high. Pity the poor fellow on the top bunk who rolled out of bed! It

was a good two-story drop to the floor.

There was lots of bitching but most of the men took the crowded quarters cheerfully. Many

of them slept on deck when the weather was warm, and almost everyone caught up on sleep.

All in all, there was quite a bit to occupy a fellow who really wanted to find entertainment.

The first few days there was the newness of ocean travel—and probably a bit of seasickness. After

that, there was a varied recreational program, organized by the permanent party aboard ship

and the regimental Special Service officer, 1st Lt. SPENCER L. WYATT. There were movies on

deck, or if you didn’t care for that, boxing bouts on promenade deck aft. On board were two

USO units, and every night in the big troop mess, they performed for capacity houses. Every day,

from noon until 2000 hours, the ship’s radio station, WARG, gave out with music, news and variety

programs.

When there was nothing else to do, men read, played endless hours of poker, or walked the

deck, watching the waves or the other ships in the convoy. And, inevitably, came the boat drills,

when everyone donned life jackets and rushed madly on deck.

T

2

The decks were crowded when the ship sailed through the Straits of Gibraltar, and everyone

strained his eyes and neck for a first glimpse of the “Rock.” It was the first sight of land in eleven

days. Even though it was foreign soil and a long way from home, it was land and it looked good.

Thirteen days after embarking and two days before Christmas, the Argentina sailed into

Naples harbor. That night, as the ship lay at anchor in what had been called the most beautiful

harbor in the world, and as Sgt. JAMES D. SULLIVAN and the 86th Band played their last deck

concert, the 86th prepared to disembark.

Next morning, the mountain troops saw their first signs of war, as they gazed at rusty hulks

of once-great ships that filled the harbor. They saw more of war’s after-effects as they were

whisked through the oft-bombed streets of Naples to their first stop, the half-completed buildings

of an orphanage in Bagnoli, a suburb of the great city.

Bagnoli was a staging area, and the regiment was not to remain there long, for which most of

the men were grateful. The marble floors they slept on were cold, and the rations were infinitesimal.

Two days after the landing, on Christmas day, the First Battalion and Headquarters

Company, minus the I & R [Intelligence & Reconnaissance] Platoon, left by train to serve as an

advance party in a newly assigned area. The movement was delayed by a train wreck and had to

be completed by truck.

On the 26th, the remainder of the regiment left Bagnoli by truck for Naples port. There they

once more boarded ship, this time on an old Italian freighter, the Sestriere. Compared to this,

conditions on the Argentina had been wonderful.

Fortunately, it was only a short trip up the west coast of Italy to Leghorn. At 1500, December

27, the regiment disembarked and loaded on trucks. Company K, under Capt. FREDERICK

DOLE, was left to guard the equipment while it was being unloaded. Other companies proceeded

to an advance staging area near Pisa. As the trucks wound along the road, almost every

GI had a good view of the Leaning Tower of Pisa looming up on the horizon.

At Pisa a model bivouac was established. In record time, Major WILLIAM BOWERMAN,

regimental S-4, contacted local authorities and made arrangements to obtain items that were

short. The regiment was supplied with its organic transportation. Showdown inspections were

held, and requisitions of equipment and clothing filled out. During the five days of the regiment’s

time spent at Pisa, several general officers visited the area; all commented favorably on

the completeness of equipment and the exact knowledge of shortages.

Most of the men were still drawing additional equipment (the most appreciated of which

were two additional blankets, for the Italian nights were unexpectedly chilly) when the advance

party, consisting of two platoons from Company B and one from Company I, together with men

from Headquarters, Service, and the Medics, moved out. At 1600 on the last day of the year, the

regiment moved out in truck convoy for its new bivouac area at Quercianella, just south of Leghorn

on the coast. At this time, the unit was released from the tactical control of the Peninsular

Base Section and came into the sphere of the Fifth Army.

In Quercianella the regiment once more lived in tents. The rain poured down and, as the

men slogged through the ankle-deep mud, they recalled the newsreels they had seen of fighting

in the Italian rain. The line units engaged in routine training and men packed most of their

equipment into their duffle bags, preparatory to storing it away.

Meanwhile the 86th was attached to IV Corps, which had big—and speedy—plans for the

regiment. Colonel TOMLINSON attended a conference at IV Corps headquarters in Lucca on the

Dec 23

Dec 27

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6th of January, and almost at the same time, the regiment received a warning order, preparatory

to moving on to the line.

The casualties, which are the inevitable result of war, were not to wait until the 86th moved

to the front. A bivouac-area guard walked off his assigned route along a railroad track, stepped

on a German “S” mine, and blew himself into eternity. Excited soldiers who rushed to his aid

detonated other mines in the area, and the resulting series of explosions killed seven men, including

the Catholic chaplain, 1st Lt. CLARENCE J. HAGAN. [An eighth man, T/Sgt. CHARLES J.

VADEBONCOEUR, died of wounds four days later.] To remove the bodies, five men from

Headquarters Company 2nd Battalion volunteered to clear the minefield. For this dangerous and

difficult work, Major General CRITTENBERGER, Commander of IV Corps, awarded the Soldier’s

Medal to 1st Lt. JACK C. CULBREATH, T/Sgt., WILLIAM F. BECHDOLT, Sgt. DAVID D.

CURTIS, Sgt. CROSBY T. PERRY-SMITH, and Cpl. HENRY J. MCDONALD in an informal ceremony.

Field Order 1, 86th Mountain Infantry, signed by Colonel CLARENCE M. TOMLINSON,

January 6, 1945, ordered the regiment moved to a position on the line. And so, just two weeks

after disembarking in Italy, the 86th was on its way to the front. The advance party moved out of

Quercianella January 7. They contacted Task Force 45, under whose control the 86th was to operate,

and also the units to be relieved. On the 8th, the rest of the regiment began its departure

from the bivouac area. By 1830 that night the three battalions were in their initial positions: the

1st Battalion in the vicinity of Castelluccio, the 2nd near San Marcello, and the 3rd in Bagni di

Lucca.

The 1st Battalion completed the relief of units of Task Force 45 at 0706 the next morning. At

1300 the regimental CP [Command Post] was opened in San Marcello. By nightfall, communication

was set up, and the 86th had begun to function as a combat unit, holding its sector of the

line.

The sector of the line assigned to the 86th was one of the most rugged of the entire front, so

far as terrain was concerned. The 1st Battalion, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel

HENRY J. HAMPTON, was on the right, charged with holding the territory southwest of Mt.

Belvedere and facing formidable Riva Ridge, from whose heights the Germans had perfect observation.

The 2nd Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel DURED E. TOWNEND, occupied

the valley to the north of San Marcello. Major JOHN H. HAY’s 3rd Battalion was in mobile reserve,

less one company at Bagni di Lucca.

The 86th remained on the line from 9 January to 2 February. During this period the front was

generally quiet, but there was constant patrolling, and most of the men saw enough action to

constitute a baptism of fire. What the 86th did during its first tour of duty on the line can best be

explained by a detailed account of a few of the patrols and skirmishes that occurred.

One of the first assignments for the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon was a patrol,

which because of the mission and terrain to be covered, called for the utmost in courage, skill and

determination. The platoon, under the direction of 1st Lt. DONALD E. TRAYNOR, was ordered

by the regimental S-2, Capt. DAVID PFAELZER, to send out a reconnaissance patrol deep into

enemy territory and to cover almost the entire regimental sector from left to right, or roughly

from southwest to northeast. The distance to be traversed was not excessive on the map, but the

difficulties of travel, weather conditions, and the terrain made the trip an extremely difficult 20-

mile journey. The entire distance was to be covered on foot or on skis, and most of the patrol

route was known to be subject to direct enemy observation.

Jan 6

Jan 8

4

Lt. TRAYNOR chose four expert skiers to accompany him. The men—Sgt. STEPHEN P.

KNOWLTON, Cpl. HARRY BRANDT, Pfc. CRAGG D. GILBERT and Pfc. HARVEY SLATER—

were all veteran mountain troopers, prepared to cope with almost any phase of mountain

travel. Realizing the difficulty of the assignment, Capt. PFAELZER allotted three full days for the

trip. The mission of the patrol was two-fold: to observe enemy movements in their forward areas,

particularly on Mt. Spigolino; and to determine whether there were adequate approach

routes along which to move a reinforced company.

Equipment carried was at the minimum. Besides rations, each man carried only a sleeping

bag, sox, skis, and his personal equipment. The trip was made from San Marcello to the little

town of Spignana by jeep and weasel, and at 1630 on the afternoon of January 21, the patrol

jumped off. During the first mile, they gained almost 1000 feet in altitude. As they approached

the top of the ridge, it became evident that a storm was coming up. The patrol found shelter in a

cabin occupied by British artillerymen.

While part of the patrol rested in the cabin, Lt. TRAYNOR and Sgt. KNOWLTON reconnoitered

the top of the ridge in preparation for the next day’s advance. After looking over the situation,

they considered that it was best to travel by night, and so, at 0030 January 22, after tea and

crumpets with the British, the patrol was once more on its way. Dressed in their camouflage

whites, they were able to move with comparative safety up the nearly 2000 feet to the top of the

ridge. The stiff wind that assaulted them as they neared the top discouraged any thought of

breaks or rest periods.

From 0030 until 0530, no stops were made except to check direction and location on the map.

On the far side of the ridge—the Abetone side—the patrol saw its first sign of enemy activity:

fresh tracks in the snow. Cautiously they contoured along the side of the ridge, making their way

with difficulty across the avalanche slopes. In snow they used skis, but frequent rocky areas

made it necessary to be off and on the “boards” intermittently. By daybreak they had reached a

point where they could observe easily both our own lines and the enemy’s. The all-night grind

had sapped their strength, but they pushed on.

As the patrol moved, the men observed. Pfc. GILBERT was the first to pick out a two-story

building which looked to be a German OP [Observation Post]. Now the men were in their element,

for they could travel across the long open snow slopes with comparative ease. Skiing all

the way, they headed through a pass and down into the valley that led to Vidiciatico and allowed

observation of Mt. Spigolino. The terrain was confusing and difficult to place on the map, but

Pfc. SLATER was able to orient the patrol and keep it on its course.

At 0900 Cpl. BRANDT spotted five men at the bottom of the valley. The patrol took cover,

and two men moved forward to look over the situation. Investigation proved that the patrol was

a friendly one, a combat patrol sent out by Company A, 86th Mountain Infantry. The Company

A patrol informed the I & R men of something they already knew well, that they were under constant

enemy observation and subject at all times to sniper fire.

By 1200 the patrol had reached the advanced listening post of Company A. From this position,

they were able to pick out three Germans, far up on the ridge across the valley. By now the

patrol was eager to conclude its mission. They had been traveling with little or no rest for 14

hours. They sped down the valley in plain view of the Germans and entered our lines at 1430.

The mission had been accomplished. Enemy installations in the vicinity of Mt. Spigolino had

been observed, and the result of the route reconnaissance was a cautious report: that a reinforced

company could be moved through the territory, only if they were expert mountaineers and prop-

Jan 21

5

erly equipped. And the amazing thing was, that of the three days that had been allotted them,

the patrol had used just 22 hours—and a considerable portion of that time was spent in the cabin

of the British artillerymen.

Not so grueling, but more exciting, was the action of Patrol 250, which gained for two of its

members the award of the Bronze Star. This kind of fighting didn’t make the newspaper headlines,

but it was deadly serious to the men who were taking part in it. At 0100 January 25, Patrol

250 left Company F’s CP. The patrol was led by 1st Lt. FRANK B. FOSTER of Company F and

2nd Lt. MOUNT G. WILD, 2nd Battalion S-2, who won one of the Bronze Stars for his part in the

action. The mission was a routine one: a combat reconnaissance patrol with the objective of discovering

if the enemy was using an OP previously located on Mt. La Serra, and if so, to destroy

the OP. If the OP was not occupied, the patrol was to return by way of Campetti-Pianosinatico

and locate the forward enemy position there. Prisoners were to be taken if possible.

The patrol ascended Mt. Orlando and finding no one there, continued to the summit of La

Serra, arriving there at 0600. The patrol found one empty fortified enemy OP. They remained on

la Serra for over an hour, but seeing no sign of enemy action, returned to Quercia to make contact

with a friendly patrol, which was prepared to support a withdrawal from la Serra in case of trouble

there.

Considering the foggy, misty weather, perfect for ambushing and taking of prisoners, Lt.

FOSTER and Lt. WILD determined to divide the patrol into two groups. Each commanded a

group and the two parties moved cautiously into Pianosinatico. Lt. WILD’s patrol led the way,

with Lt. FOSTER’s men prepared to support the leading group in case of a firefight. The two

groups moved past Campetti and crossed an open clearing to the next ridge. Suddenly Pfc.

WENDELL H. CHENEY and Pfc. PAUL BUCHANAN heard talking and pointed out the direction

to the two officers. About 100 feet to the front of the patrol was a dugout in the side of the

hill. Smoke curled from a stovepipe at the top.

The officers silently withdrew their men and made plans for the attack. It was decided that a

four-man covering force under Sgt. ARTHUR THOMPSON would cover the open space in front

of the pillbox and also protect the rear so that the patrol could not be cut off. Lt. WILD and Pfc.

BUD M. COX were to assault the position from the rear and capture prisoners. COX was armed

with a submachine gun. The remainder of the patrol under Lt. FOSTER was to cover the hill behind

the pillbox.

The covering group went into position while the flanking force began its encircling movement.

When the flanking force reached its position, Lt. FOSTER called for a smoke concentration

on the village of Pianosinatico. Almost immediately mortar fire began landing.

Lt. WILD and Pfc. COX started forward to assault the position. When they had gone only

about six feet, two men came out of the pillbox. The two enemies did not see the attackers. Just

as the Lieutenant and COX started to move forward again, a third enemy came around the corner

of the dugout. He was only about 25 feet from the Americans and saw them instantly. Just as the

German let out a cry of alarm, Lt. WILD opened fire with his carbine on the first two Krauts,

while COX put three bursts of submachine gun fire into the third enemy. Lt. FOSTER and the

flanking element also opened fire.

The German reaction was instantaneous. Intense machine pistol fire opened up, and hand

grenades began landing in the midst of the attacking forces. One bullet went through Lt. WILD’s

sleeve, while a hand grenade, which landed directly in front of Pfc. WILLIAM A. CRUMP, did

nothing except remove CRUMP’s glasses from his nose.

Jan 25

6

The Krauts quickly maneuvered to surround the Americans. Enemy began to move up the

hillside from the north. The patrol was reluctant to withdraw, but it would have been suicide to

charge the pillbox through the crotch-deep snow. COX attempted to crawl forward but was soon

floundering in the soft white powder. It was his courage here that was to result in the award of a

Bronze Star. Mortar shells began to land in the midst of the patrol. Lt. WILD determined that it

was time to go home.

Lt. WILD and Pfc. COX withdrew first, and then served as a covering force while the flanking

element under Lt. FOSTER retreated past them to the cover of an empty pillbox. Pfc. DON E.

ARDINGER, the radio operator, was unable to move with any speed through the snow while carrying

the heavy radio, so the officers ordered the radio destroyed. Sgt. GEORGE MOTZENBECKER

used his M-1 to put the radio out of action. Despite heavy mortar fire, followed soon

after by artillery, the patrol withdrew to safety without casualties.

It would require a volume to detail all the patrols and skirmishes in which the men of the

86th engaged during their first three weeks on the line, but the two previously described are typical

and exemplary. Mention should be made of Technical Sergeant HAROLD J. HALL, whose

Company B patrol was ambushed. Though mortally wounded, he continued to direct the actions

of his patrol in their attack on the ambushing forces. After he died, Staff Sergeant DONALD G.

HAIGHT took over the patrol and directed its withdrawal to safety. The withdrawal was largely

made possible through the heroism of Pfc. HAROLD LLOYD, who stood erect to draw enemy

fire away from his withdrawing buddies.

Early on the morning of January 28, the 86th was relieved from Task Force 45 and passed

back into the control of the 10th Mountain Division. On February 2, the 86th was relieved by

elements of the 87th and 85th regiments and reverted to Corps reserve. The troops were withdrawn

to a training area in the vicinity of Lucca, and a CP was opened in a beautiful villa in the

little hamlet of San Cassiano di Moriano.

As the regiment rested and trained in its rear area near the old walled city of Lucca, there was

a suspenseful and somewhat grim expectation in the air. The first short tour of duty on the line

had been too calm and uneventful. This was not the kind of war Ernie Pyle wrote about. There

must be something more important, more exciting, more deadly in the future. And most of the

men took a hint from their day-to-day activities that the “future” was not far off. They were

right.

While the 86th was still holding a sector of the line, the plans had been brewing. Operation

“X,” it was called. Colonel TOMLINSON, Lieutenant Colonel ROBERT L. COOK, executive officer,

Capt. PFAELZER, and Major DONALD C. ALLEN, S-3, had carefully looked over the terrain,

the estimated enemy strength, and the objective to be taken. Lieutenant Colonel HAMPTON had

figured importantly in the planning. Their reports had gone back to Division. And now, at any

moment, they expected the order to move back to the line and participate in the actual operation—

an operation which was to give the 86th Mountain Infantry its first test as a combat

unit—an operation which could make or break the outfit in the eyes of other units in the theater

and, most, most important, the still dimly realized enemy “up there.”

At last the order came. Field Order 9, Headquarters, Task Force 45, was the hottest of “hot

poop” and “top secret.” In it was outlined the mission of the Division: “Attack on the Mt.

Belvedere-Mt. della Torraccia Ridge.” But most important to the men of the 86th, who were not

yet privileged to know it, would have been the news that it was on the 86th that the first brunt of

the attack was to fall. To the southwest of Belvedere, the principal divisional objective, ran a

Feb 2

7

rugged line of snow-capped peaks, the Mt. Mancinello-Pizzo di Campiano Ridge, later called

Riva Ridge. If Belvedere was to be taken and held, American forces must first secure this ridgeline,

for it flanked Belvedere and furnished a magnificent observation point. From it the Germans

could see every action of the American and Brazilian forces facing them. As long as the

enemy held the ridge, the movements of the Allied troops on the inadequate road-net in the valley

below were necessarily limited. It was not likely that the Germans underestimated the importance

of the ridge. S-2’s information placed elements of the German 232nd Infantry Division on

the ridge. And these troops were prepared to fight. Four times Belvedere had been taken and

four times strong German counterattacks had forced the Allies back.

To the 86th in its first real combat mission fell the difficult job of securing this strategic terrain

feature. It was a tough nut to crack. Against the obvious disadvantage of terrain, weather, and

well-dug-in German positions, the 86th could marshal one factor—but, as later events were to

prove, that one was decisive. The Germans considered the ridgeline virtually impregnable to any

large body of troops because of its natural ruggedness. The steep icy cliffs would have discouraged

any “flatland” outfit. Unluckily for the “Tedeschi,” the 86th was no flatland outfit. The

cliffs below Serrasiccia and Cappel Buso were rugged, but to trained rock climbers and mountain

men they were far from impassable. Therein lay the American advantage, and the undoing of the

surprised Germans, who were to wake up one morning soon with the men of the 86th virtually

on top of their positions.

Field Order 9 had come February 15. Close on its heels was the Regimental Field Order 3,

which was published February 16, 1945. Here the plans were given in more detail. The mission

of the regiment was “to attack, seize and hold Campiano Ridge, Pizzo di Campiano south to

Chingio Bure [Cingio del Bure].” In addition to this, the 3rd Battalion, commanded by Major

HAY, was to relieve the left battalion of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force and thus be in a position

to protect the right flank of the Division.

In the fore of the attack was to be Colonel HAMPTON’s 1st Battalion. From their assembly

areas at the base of Campiano Ridge, they were to attack and seize the ridge from Campiano to

Mancinello by 0515, February 19. The attack to the east on Belvedere was to jump off at 2300,

February 19. It was imperative that the 86th gain its objectives before that time.

Colonel TOWNSEND’s 2nd Battalion was to furnish one company (with attached weapons)

which, after moving through Vidiciatico and Madna dell’Acero, was to occupy the ridge south of

Mt. Mancinello. This action was necessary to protect the left flank of the 1st Battalion and to prevent

enemy movement to the north and east. After taking the objective, these troops were to be

prepared to attack north along the ridge. Another 2nd Battalion company was to relieve the left

company of 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry, and from this position move up to protect the right

flank of the regiment. One heavy machine gun platoon was assigned to operate 50-caliber machine

guns in support of the 1st Battalion attack.

Once the order had reached the battalion commanders, there was plenty of activity. Men

were stripped to the bare essentials of fighting equipment. Duffel bags were turned in and

stored. Everything was made ready to move. On Sunday, February 13, the initial reconnaissance

for CP’s bivouac areas, etc. had been made. On February 14, advance parties began to leave and

move north into the new areas. On February 15, Capt. PFAELZER established the forward CP at

la Ca. From the CP building, one could look almost directly up at the Germans who commanded

the heights in a semi-circle all around the narrow valley held by the Americans. Already at the

CP were Lt. TRAYNOR and half of the regimental I & R Platoon, who were selecting and establishing

OP sites for the coming operation.

8

The main body of the troops was to move on the afternoon and night of February 17. At 0900

on that morning Colonel TOMLINSON left San Cassiano for la Ca. Stopping at the Division CP

in Lizzano, he received his final instructions. By 1550 that afternoon, all the battalions had

cleared their old areas, and the regiment was moving up. Only scattered elements of Headquarters

Company and Service Company remained behind. At San Cassiano, 1st Lt. SPENCER L.

WYATT and Warrant Officer DONAVAN A. OWEN commanded a rear CP which was to move

within a few days to Maresca, near Campo Tizzoro.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions detrucked in the vicinity of Castelluccio and moved out immediately.

By midnight the long lines of trudging soldiers in the 1st Battalion had cleared Vidiciatico.

Above their heads, piercing the pitch-black darkness like long fingers of molten steel were the

powerful searchlights playing relentlessly on the slopes of Belvedere and Campiano. Between

the columns of men rolled a steady column of jeeps and trucks, as supplies, ammunition and

equipment moved up. All identifying marks on the vehicles had been covered. All movement

had been made at night. Blackout regulations had been strictly enforced. It seemed incredible to

the men that the Germans watching from their OPs on the hill did not know what was transpiring

below them, but all were hopeful that much of the preparation had escaped the notice of the

Boche S-2s.

At 0500 on the morning of the 18th, the 3rd Battalion completed the occupation of its positions

on the right flank. An hour and a half later, the 1st Battalion opened its CP at Farne.

Shortly thereafter the 2nd was in place. By daylight the whole regiment was in its rear assembly

area.

The 18th of February was a busy day, for officers and men alike. To maintain the element of

surprise, men must stay under cover, but there was plenty to keep them occupied. Weapons

were checked and double-checked, ammunition issued, equipment inspected. By now, every

man knew “this was it.” Nobody had to tell the rifleman to see if his M-1 was in working order.

This was no “spit-and-polish” affair; this was life and death.

Colonel TOMLINSON assembled his battalion commanders for a conference in la Ca. Present

were also the commanding officers of the 751st Tank Battalion and the 701st Tank Destroyer

Battalion to coordinate their plans with those of the regiment. Liaison officers from the 605th

Field Artillery and Company A, 84th Chemical Mortar Battalion participated. Together the officers

welded their individual planning into one integrated schedule.

Busy, too, were the supply personnel. Major WILLIAM BOWERMAN, S-4, was in and out of

la Ca all day, coordinating his efforts with those of the 10th Quartermaster Pack, arranging for

ammunition, sleds, camouflage nets, and all the millions of other articles which a modern infantry

regiment requires for a major operation.

It was Major BOWERMAN’s job to insure that the 86th was “thar fustest with the mostest.”

In the terrain where the operation was to take place, that was one of the most difficult of problems.

Captain PFAELZER made elaborate arrangements to insure that the CP could keep in touch

with everything that went on during the action. Conferring with 1st Lt. WILSON WARE, 2nd Lt.

MOUNT G. WILD and 1st Lt. DAVID BROWER, the three Battalion S-2s, he ordered positive information

reported as it occurred. Negative reports were to be made every half-hour. Methods

of PW evacuation had been worked out, and in order to secure more information on the spot

about enemy action, Captain PFAELZER asked Division for a prisoner interrogator. An IPW

team of two men was immediately attached to the regiment.

Feb 17

9

At 1629 on the afternoon of the 18th came a message from Major General GEORGE P. HAYS,

the commanding general, to Colonel TOMLINSON, giving a last-minute summary of the mission

and also certain amendments to Field Order 9. The changes were minor. The big picture remained

the same: “seize and hold the Mt. Mancinello-Pizzo di Campiano Ridge prior to daylight

February 19, 1945.”

Things began to hum. No one in the regiment had plans for sleep that night. Officers were in

and out of the CP. Captain WILLIAM NEIDNER, commander of Company A, which was to play

an important part in the night’s operation, stopped in for last-minute information. 1st Lt. PRESTON

COURSEN, Liaison Officer with Division, brought photographs of Belvedere. Lt. ROBERT

K. POTTER, Graves Registration Officer, arrived at 1830. His was the unpleasant job of supervising

evacuation of the killed. Everyone fervently hoped that he would have little to do, but he and

his staff were fully prepared for any eventuality. Lieutenant Colonel COOK was everywhere,

straightening out last-minute difficulties.

Major BOWERMAN’s supply situation was shaping up. A Quartermaster Pack company

was attached to the 1st Battalion and already was being guided up to the battalion position. At

1900, six mules for the sleds to be used by the 1st Battalion, were guided into la Ca by M/Sgt.

JOHN W. TAYLOR of Service Company. The use of the mules with sleds was something comparatively

new, the result of extensive experiments carried out by 1st Lt. JERRY P. BOOKER in

January during the regiment’s period on the line.

H-Hour!! At 1930 B and C Companies moved out of their assembly areas to begin the long

tortuous climb up Campiano Ridge. It was assumed that Company A had moved out too,

though all communications with that company were out. The front was ominously quiet. The I

& R Platoon had three outposts well beyond the lines, and all reports were negative. Only one

German had been sighted—that one by the 2nd Battalion, who reported that he was walking leisurely

along the ridge. It was the lull before the storm.

Slowly the assault platoons of the 1st Battalion, struggling under their burdens of ammunitions

and grenades, worked their way up the cliffs. Company B was halfway up at 2142. A and

C Companies were well under way. As yet, no opposition. The men toiling up the hills began to

wonder whether there really were Jerries on the ridge. The suspense, the waiting, expecting any

moment to hear a machine pistol open up, was almost as bad as an actual firefight. Everyone

began to understand the real meaning of the term “sweating it out.”

The plan of attack, largely worked out by Colonel HAMPTON, was not a complicated one.

Company A, Captain WILLIAM NEIDNER’s company, less one detached platoon, was to move

west and take Mt. Mancinello. Company B, commanded by Captain KENNETH SEIGMAN, had

as its objective Mt. Cappel Buso. Captain WORTH MCCLURE’s Company C was assigned to

occupy Mt. Serrasiccia. Supporting the attack was Company F, under Captain PERCY RIDEOUT,

former Dartmouth ski coach, with the mission of attacking Cingio del Bure. Also supporting the

attack was the heavy weapons company, Captain ERWIN NILSSON commanding, which was

everywhere. The plan sounded almost too simple; it turned out to be near-perfect strategy.

To understand the magnitude of the task before them, the men of the 1st Battalion had only

to look at the terrain. The ridge rose 1500 to 2000 feet from the valley, and from the bottom it appeared

unclimbable. Most of the trails were icy, and if they were not icy, they were either rocky

or muddy. Bending almost double under full field packs, the men scrambled up, cursing in

whispers when they slipped and fell. Two columns had to use ropes. Slowly but inexorably the

battalion worked its way up.

Feb 18

10

At 0030, even the officers began to wonder where the Krauts were. Repeated negative reports

had come from the three observation posts. B Company reported that its assault platoon

was on the crest of the ridge at Cappel Buso. True, the first casualty was occurring at 0045, when

Captain GORDON STIMSON, Munitions Officer, phoned that one of his drivers had been injured

by artillery shrapnel near Porretta Terme at 2330. This was not the news the OP was waiting for.

At 0045 Company A was on the ridge at Mancinello. Company F had already crossed the

river that flowed through the gorge just below its objective. Company B was moving along the

crest of Cappel Buso. Then came what every man had expected—and dreaded—all night.

Sgt. WARREN D. JOHNSON and Cpl. DAN BAKER of I & R, manning OP #3, reported

German machine guns, small arms, and mortar fire south of Cappel Buso. The direction of fire

was northeast. A minute later, at 0111, Sgt. STEPHEN KNOWLTON and Cpl. HARRY BRANDT

of OP #2 confirmed the report. Almost before Captain PFAELZER could phone the information

to Division, the whole story began to come in from Company B, 400 yards from their objective.

The assault platoon had made contact with the enemy. Now they were engaged in a fierce firefight.

The calm was over. This was the storm. Since our men were on the ridge itself, the giant

searchlights were now a liability; they were extinguished. In the blackness, Company B moved in

on the Germans, who were caught by surprise. The flashes of their rifles and machine guns outlined

the top of the ridge and the crackle of fire reverberated down the valley. In an hour it was

over. All of the company was on top of Cappel Buso. They had suffered one casualty [Pfc.

ELLERY J. POTTER] and the Germans had been forced to withdraw. Expecting the inevitable

German counterattack, Company B was digging in.

Meanwhile, Company A was advancing north along Mancinello Ridge, still without opposition.

At 0259 they reached their objective and immediately began to organize the position. Approximately

an hour later, Company F reached Cingio del Bure and established contact with

Company A. At 0505 Company C, which had the longest and hardest climb, finally settled down

on Mt. Serrasiccia.

The objectives were reached—with little fighting and with almost complete surprise. A few

grenades tossed into earthen pillboxes, a few pasty-faced trembling German prisoners, and the

ridge that “couldn’t be taken” was ours. Now the problem was to keep it.

The original attack plan included the withdrawal of Company F as soon as the ridge was

consolidated. As it developed, however, it was Captain RIDEOUT’s company that drew the first

counterattack. At 0853 mortar and machine gun fire opened up on the positions of Company F’s

mountain platoon at Le Piagge in the vicinity of Serra dei Baichetti. By 0925 they had suffered

two casualties. 2nd Battalion mortar fire began to drop on the enemy. At 1151 the company took

the offensive and moved on to Baichetti, killing one German and capturing another. But the

Krauts were stubborn, and the intermittent firefight continued.

At the same time, the detached platoon from Company A, which had been assigned the mission

of occupying Pizzo di Campiano, was in the first phases of an action which was to win recognition

for every man in the platoon. Under the command of 2nd Lt. JAMES W. LOOSE, the

platoon took its objective at 0544. It had required nine hours to make the climb and they had

taken the position only after facing small arms fire and trip-wire grenades, which rolled down the

steep slopes on them. Almost immediately after reaching the summit, the platoon was counterattacked

by an enemy squad in a thirty-minute firefight. With the first light of the morning, Lt.

LOOSE located a group of enemy in a house southwest of his lines. The enemy commanded the

Feb 19

11

terrain with automatic weapons. Lt. LOOSE organized a patrol which approached the house,

wiped out its occupants, and captured the weapons. At 0830 the enemy again counterattacked.

Once more Lt. LOOSE and his platoon sergeant, T/Sgt. THOMAS P. BOYD, directed the platoon

in a successful defense, which culminated in an attack on the enemy force, inflicting several casualties.

At 1000 the platoon received a twenty-minute artillery barrage. One man was killed and

one wounded.

Things were quiet until 1500 when once again the artillery began to fall. At 1700 about 20 enemy

made their way up the southwest face of Pizzo di Campiano onto the high ground between

Lt. LOOSE’s position and that of Company B on Cappel Buso, thus isolating the platoon. At 2000

another twenty enemy approached from the northwest and launched a coordinated attack, which

continued without relenting throughout the night. In his last message to his battalion commander

before all communication was cut off, Lt. LOOSE radioed: “Where’s that artillery support?

If it doesn’t get here soon, you’ll have nothing left to support.” At 0200 American artillery

began to fall among the enemy, but they continued to attack. Once the Krauts actually reached

the cone and began scrambling up it, heaving hand grenades. The artillery observers ordered

artillery directly on the position. It did the job, catching the exposed Krauts on the walls of the

cone but doing little damage to the Yanks, deep in their foxholes on the top. At 0800 on the

morning of February 21, after ten hours of fighting and with virtually all of their ammunition exhausted,

the platoon finally broke up and routed the attacking forces. In all, it had repelled seven

vicious counterthrusts, killing twenty-six Germans and capturing seven, while suffering few

casualties among its own group.

Relief came in the form of reinforcements, 2nd Lt. FLOYD P. HALLETT’s B Company platoon,

guided by battalion commander Colonel HAMPTON, which finally fought their way

through to the isolated platoon at 1700 on the 21st. Without food, water, or communication for 36

hours, the platoon had withstood repeated artillery barrages and attacks. Its supplies replenished,

it remained in its position until relieved on January 22 by HALLETT’s platoon.

Back at the CP on February 19, the first prisoners had begun to arrive for questioning. At

1400 three Germans, one wounded, were brought in. Captured by Company A, they were the

first of a steady stream who were to furnish valuable information about the German units. The

prisoners seemed to be of two classes: the elite mountain troops of the 4th Mountain Battalion,

who were mostly Austrian and Bavarian; and a sad-looking lot of old men and kids from the

1044th Regiment. From the first captured men, the IPW team was able to obtain the German

passwords for the next four days.

While the prisoners were being brought in, Company C on Mt. Serrasiccia was fighting off a

40-man German counterattack. Forced to pull back off the crest, they called for artillery support,

and the resulting barrage, including 83 mm and 60 mm mortar fire, temporarily broke up the attack.

It soon began again, and now the Germans brought out the first of many underhanded

ruses that were to rouse the fighting ire of the men of the 86th and make many a Jerry wish he

had never heard of the American ski troops. A large group of Germans came out of cover with

hands raised high as if in surrender. Captain MCCLURE’s company held their fire and the Germans

drew close to their positions. At the bottom of the little ridge on which Company C was

dug in, the Germans suddenly fell to the ground, brought out their weapons, and opened fire.

Company C had not been fooled, and the Germans gained nothing but numerous casualties from

the trick.

The Krauts were beginning to pour artillery into our positions. Le Piagge, Campiano,

Baichetti and Farne were receiving heavy mortar and artillery fire. These were but the first of

12

many German barrages which were to teach the Americans a healthy respect for the Jerry artillery.

In comparison with artillery casualties, the number of dead and wounded from small arms

and hand-to-hand fighting were negligible and would remain so throughout the first phases of

the campaign.

Company A on Mt. Mancinello was busy, for the Germans had launched attacks up and

down the line. Captain NEIDNER’s men had killed four and captured eight and the fighting continued.

A Company was fighting mad, for the Germans had killed an aid man as he attempted to

treat the wounded. The Air Force gave strong support as it bombed troop concentrations slightly

to the rear.

It is impossible to describe the difficulties of supply during this period of the operation.

Supply was carried almost entirely by mules and on human backs, though weasels could be used

in some localities. As soon as the battalion was in position, 1st Lt. WALTER TREVOR, 1st Battalion

S-4, immediately requested 36 more mules to carry supplies up the winding mountain trails.

The carrying parties, under the general direction of 1st Lt. DYSON DUNCAN, did a magnificent

job. One group, led by 1st Lt. SPEROS BOUDOURES of Company D, ran into an enemy machine

gun. Lt. BOUDOURES was wounded almost immediately, but Pvt. MICHAEL BOSTONIA, a

replacement in the regiment, took over the party, routed the Germans, and covered the withdrawal

of the party, assisted by Pvt. ALVIE SWEARINGEN. Minutes later, both men were killed

in an artillery barrage. 1st Sgt. URIEL V. CARPENTER and his men from Service Company

earned the highest praise and commendation from Lt. Col. TOWNSEND for their work in supplying

Company F. Despite all difficulties the supplies came through.

Intermittent firing and counterattacking continued. The artillery fired 168 rounds in support

of Lt. LOOSE’s platoon on Campiano. But the important job now was to insure maximum support

for the attack on Mt. Belvedere by the 85th and the 87th regiments. A battery of seven 50-

caliber machine guns was moved to Plinardo [1 km east of Farne] to support the attack. Two 75

mm pack howitzers also moved into approximately the same positions.

Major HAY’s 3rd Battalion was in the process of moving into its forward positions on the

right flank of the division. At 0345 Capt. WILLIAM D. DRAKE, Battalion S-3, reported that they

had reached their objectives with only one casualty. Two enemy machine gun nests had been

taken care of. Wire teams, in particular, were under heavy fire, and men of the A & P Platoon

had been pressed into service as litter bearers. Colonel COOK, executive officer of the regiment,

directed Capt. DRAKE to move his Company L under Capt. EVERETT BAILEY right along side

of the 87th as they advanced and to maintain contact. This was done throughout the remainder

of the operation. At the same time Company F was finally pulled from its positions on Bure and

moved to Poggiol Forato by order of General HAYS. One squad of Company A was sent to outpost

Bure.

Throughout the day, the 86th outposts and CP anxiously watched the progress of the attack

on Belvedere, which they could see clearly. Hundreds of civilians lined the hills around Lizzano

and Vidiciatico to watch the battle, as if it were a circus. As the day wore on, it was evident that

both the 85th and 87th were running into considerable opposition. At 0820, February 20, G-3 instructed

Major ALLEN to send one company of the 3rd Battalion to assist the 1st Battalion 85th in

attaining its objective. Major ALLEN relayed the order to Capt. DRAKE, who reported that

Company L would coordinate its attack with the 85th.

All day on the 20th, the 1st Battalion repulsed German attacks. Twenty-six dead piled up in

front of one B Company position. Seven prisoners were taken, six of them mountain troopers.

Feb 20

13

The evacuation of casualties from the Company B positions on Cappel Buso was especially difficult.

Some litter cases took as long as 20 hours, but the litter bearers of Major JOHN K. MENEELY’s

Medical Detachment worked night and day to get the wounded back to the collecting

stations. First Sgt. EDWIN THIVRIDGE of B Company was able to issue the first rations to the

men on the night of the 20th. No water was available, but the men ate snow.

On Mt. Serrasiccia, Company C battled furiously. The artillery dropped 84 rounds on the enemy

in that area with telling effect. Air support aided too, as planes swept down to bomb enemy

installations not a hundred yards from the American lines, especially in the Rocca Corneta area.

Our own 50-caliber machine guns were placing deadly fire on buildings in that vicinity—so

deadly that 4 Germans emerged from the buildings and surrendered without a fight. Five more

Germans were caught in single file by a Company H machine gun squad and mowed down.

After withdrawing Company F from Bure, Colonel TOWNSEND moved the 2nd Battalion to

Vidiciatico, taking over the billets vacated by the 3rd Battalion 87th. There they constituted

Corps reserve. Major BOWERMAN and 1st Lt. BRADFORD BOYNTON, 2nd Battalion S-4, had

already issued orders for the transport of the battalion from the front line assembly area to Vidiciatico.

At 1300 on the afternoon of the 20th, Company C jumped off in a new attack along the Serrasiccia

ridge. Despite the strong enemy resistance, partly shattered by a 15-minute artillery barrage

including effectively timed fire, Capt. MCCLURE gained his objective in 28 minutes, killing

4 enemy and forcing the remainder of the German force to withdraw. Several prisoners were

captured to add to the steady stream now flowing through the CP. There was more work than

the two interrogators could handle. Most of the PWs were thoroughly stunned. Even after losing

the ridge, they had not really been dismayed. They had lost those positions before. It was not

until after they had thrown their artillery and counterattacked that they actually realized that the

86th meant business and that it actually intended not only to take the ridge but to hold it as well.

At 0600 that morning Company L had moved up on the right flank of the division, suffering

fairly heavy casualties but everywhere reaching its objectives. They were slightly to the right of

Mt. Belvedere and were pinned down several times by enemy artillery and machine gun fire.

When they reached their objective at 1600, they had captured 33 prisoners. During the advance, a

number of men distinguished themselves by their heroism under fire. Staff Sergeant EDWARD

A. LISCIANDRO crawled across open territory under intense fire to give aid to wounded. Sgt.

SAMUEL R. BULKLEY and Pfc. THOMAS J. PATTI selected a route for the advance of the company

across unprotected terrain. PATTI was mortally wounded, but continued to advance for

200 yards.

Company L expected to be relieved by elements of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force, but at

1707, Colonel TOMLINSON ordered Captain DRAKE to remain in position until relieved by an

order from IV Corps. Later he instructed Major HAY to move into his final objective and remain

there during the night, protecting himself with heavy weapons.

At 1855 the first estimate of casualties was reported to Division G-1. In the light of what had

been accomplished, it was amazingly light, though nonetheless serious. Killed: 1 officer, 6 enlisted

men; wounded: 2 officers, 25 enlisted men. The officer killed was 1st Lt. JOHN MCCOWN

of Company C, a veteran mountain climber whose rambling bow-legged gait and contempt for

army red tape had made him a well-known figure to almost every man in the regiment. He had

been riddled by a German machine gun as he made a reconnaissance patrol.

14

There was no doubt that the enemy had suffered many times as many casualties. Even as the

report was going in, the body of a German captain was found, a victim of our artillery. In his

possession were found documents, maps, etc. of great value to Capt. PFAELZER. At 1037 the

first estimate of enemy dead was available. There were 80 bodies in the 1st Battalion area, 23 in

the 2nd’s area, and 20 in the 3rd. This was, of course, in addition to wounded and prisoners. The

casualty score was definitely in favor of the mountain men from the 86th.

The night of the 20th was comparatively quiet, with the regiment in full command of its positions.

Only Company L received a minor attack, which was repelled with ease. Forces on Campiano

received their nightly sniper and harassing fire.

Next morning plans began to develop for the relief of the 1st Battalion, which had now been

in continuous action since the night of February 18-19. The 3rd Battalion was ordered to remain

in its positions for another day and at 0830, Capt. DAVID ROSENDALE alerted the 1st Battalion

for relief. Before relief could be effected, Company B on Cappel Buso took the worst artillery

shelling of the operation. After six minutes of the German fire, there were eight casualties including

two dead.

By 1700 the 10th Reconnaissance Troop and the 10th Anti-tank Battalion were beginning to

relieve the 1st Battalion. The Recon troop was to relieve our positions on Mt. Mancinello and Mt.

Serrasiccia, as well as those on Cappel Buso and Campiano. At 2300 the Anti-tank men began to

move in, and at 0705 the next morning the entire battalion, with the exception of one platoon, had

been replaced. The dirty, unshaven soldiers who half fell down the trails were not the same persons

who had struggled up those trails a few nights before. Up there on the ridge the men had

been separated from the boys. On the night of the 19th they had been rookies, with their combat

abilities yet to be proved. Now they were veterans who had done their jobs well. But there were

no smiles on these men’s faces. Up there on the ridge they had left their buddies, men they had

lived with and worked with, many of them almost two years. They were bitter and mad, but

they were also very, very tired. Some had not slept or eaten for more than three days. Many

were heroes, recommended for combat decorations. Despite their bitterness and their weariness,

they were proud of each other and proud of themselves. In the words of General MARK CLARK,

they had done “a damn fine job.” Down from the hills, they were more than glad to get PX and

beer rations, which was little enough reward for what they had been through.

The only men of the 1st Battalion who remained on the line were the 1st Platoon of Company

B, led by 2nd Lt. FLOYD HALLETT, who had relieved Lt. LOOSE’s men on Campiano. The men

were ordered to remain where they were until nightfall. At 0800 they suffered a full-fledged attack

following a heavy mortar barrage. Two prisoners later stated that the attack was made by a

German mountain company of approximately 70 men. The nature of the terrain allowed the enemy

to approach fairly close to the defensive positions under cover. At the start of the attack the

Germans hit and immediately killed the squad leader, the BAR gunner, and seriously wounded

the machine gunner of the left flank squad. There was imminent danger of a breakthrough in

that section of the line. Pfc. ALAN ROSE, in his foxhole between two dead men, held his ground,

and though wounded in the cheek, placed heavy rifle and grenade fire on the enemy. Pfc. EDWARD

A. KOSKI, a rifleman, noted that the machine gun was unmanned. Jumping from his

foxhole he traversed open ground to the gun and put it into action. S/Sgt. ROBERT THOMPSON,

seeing the gap in the lines, quickly led his squad through a hail of fire to reinforce the position.

Standing erect as bullets kicked up the dust all around him, Sgt. THOMPSON threw grenade

after grenade at the enemy at such close range that it was necessary to hold the grenades a

couple of seconds after releasing the safety lever in order to prevent the enemy from throwing

Feb 21

15

them back. Pfc. RICHARD DOUGHTY, in another section of the line, manned his light machine

gun so effectively that a German machine gun squad withdrew in confusion, leaving their gun.

Dashing into the open, DOUGHTY captured the German gun and turned it on the fleeing enemy.

Through quick thinking and action such as this, the attack was beaten off with heavy German

casualties and two prisoners taken.

Over on the right flank of the division, the attack of the 2nd Battalion 85th had bogged down.

Suffering heavy casualties, they were unable to advance. At 0947 February 21, G-3 ordered the

3rd Battalion 86th to prepare to concentrate in the vicinity of Mazzancana in the expectation of a

supporting attack through the 85th. At 1018, as the situation steadily grew worse, G-3 ordered

Major HAY to concentrate his battalion at Mazzancana without delay. The process of moving in

this location was a difficult one, and at 2030 that night Major HAY requested engineer help on the

Gaggio Montano-Morandella-Mazzancana road, having found that the passage of tanks had

made it unsuitable for travel.

With only Lt. HALLETT’s platoon left on the line, the remainder of the regiment was in the

process of moving to Gaggio Montano where the new CP was to be set up. At 0920 February 22,

Colonel COOK, along with 1st Lt. MELVIN KAYLOR, regimental communications officer, had

moved into Gaggio Montano to establish the new CP. They were followed by Colonel TOMLINSON,

Captain WILLIAM H. HARD, regimental adjutant, and Captain PFAELZER. At 1530 the

CP in la Ca was closed.

Evidently the Germans were suspicious of Gaggio Montano for at 1549 the first of several artillery

shells fell within 50 yards of the CP building. At 1740 the CP and aid station were shelled

again. Two casualties resulted, and even the most dignified of the regimental staff assumed the

prone position, especially after one shell hit the corner of the building. At 1825 the town was

shelled a third time, and everyone agreed that the Jerries knew entirely too much about the

movement to Gaggio Montano.

Next morning, February 24th, Lt. HALLETT and his men were still on Campiano. They had

been reduced from 1 officer and 34 men to 1 officer and 23 men through enemy action. General

ROBINSON E. DUFF, after inspecting the position, recommended that they be relieved immediately.

A platoon of Company A took their place on the ridge.

The 3rd Battalion had made contact with the 2nd Battalion 85th and was now in a rear assembly

area at Mazzancanna. At 1155 Colonel TOMLINSON received orders from General

HAYS. Major HAY’s battalion was to effect relief of the 2nd Battalion 85th on the night of 23-24

February with the mission of seizing, occupying, organizing, and defending Mt. della Torraccia,

maintaining contact with the Brazilian Expeditionary Force [BEF] on the east and with the 85th

on the south. This was the area in which the 85th had been stopped and had suffered such terrible

casualties from the German artillery fire. It was the 3rd Battalion’s job to move through the

85th and take the objective. One company was sent forward immediately to act as a mobile reserve

in support of the 85th.

To direct the attack on Mt. della Torraccia, Major ALLEN and Captain PFAELZER opened a

forward CP at Mazzancanna. At 1905 on the night of the 23rd, the 3rd Battalion moved forward

to an advanced assembly area. The plan of attack, as approved by division commander Major

General GEORGE P. HAYS, called for Company I, commanded by Captain ROE D. WATSON, to

relieve Company G 85th at 2200. Company K, under Captain FREDERICK DOLE, was to be in a

forward area, while Company L, under Captain EVERETT C. BAILEY, was to be in reserve. At

0650 February 24, the division artillery was to barrage della Torraccia. At 0700 Company I was to

Feb 22

Feb 24

Feb 23

16

attack to the right, and Company K, passing through elements of Company E 85th, would attack

to the left. Air support was to be furnished. The objectives were the mountain itself and spurs

that jutted out 500 yards to northeast and northwest. The attack began right on schedule. Almost

immediately Company I and Company K met heavy automatic weapons fire. Despite this fire

and intense artillery, the battalion took its original objectives at 0857, and the objective was then

broadened to include two more hills. At 1125 these also had been taken and positions on them

were being organized. At 1210, Company I, then at Le Borre, was ordered to take another hill. It

accomplished this final mission at 1215. The ground was taken, but at heavy cost. Company K,

for instance, had suffered about 12% casualties.

The battalion immediately dug in: Company I on Hill 991 and at Le Borre; Company L with

one platoon at i Felicari and the remainder of the company on the reverse slope of Hill 1079 near

Le Grotte; and Company K on the left, on Mt. della Torraccia.

The Germans were not happy about losing this ground. All night, artillery fell on the Americans.

Some casualties resulted, but the men burrowed their foxholes further into the cold dirt to

escape the flying shrapnel, and when morning came, most of them were still there.

Back at Gaggio Montano plans were already afoot to relieve the battalion with Colonel

TOWNSEND’s companies. But before the relief could take place, the Germans hit Torraccia with

everything they had.

At 1620 on the afternoon of the 24th, the Boche attacked Company K’s left flank, supported

by artillery. At 1850 it appeared that the attack had been effectively repulsed, but at 2325 new

attacks had to be beaten off and 60 more rounds of artillery fell. At 0020 Major HAY reported to

the CP that they were holding their own but that “artillery was everywhere.” Support was called

for from Company C, 84th Chemical Battalion, which fired 175 rounds.

At 0110, Major ALLEN phoned Major HAY, asking, “Have you anything to report? Do you

need any help?” To which Major HAY replied, “Hell no, we don’t need any help here. We’re

doing all right.”

Though the 3rd refused to move back an inch, it was suffering heavy casualties. Major HAY

requested all available litter bearers and aid men. The 2nd Platoon of Company B was dispatched

to aid in evacuation of the wounded. The men gritted their teeth as they carried aid men

who had been shot through their Red Cross-labeled helmets.

At 0230 the situation, which had admittedly been serious for a time, was well under control.

Major HAY requested an IPW team, as many prisoners were being taken. There was no enemy to

the right; the enemy in the middle sector was withdrawing; while many of the Germans on the

left were surrendering.

The attack continued spasmodically throughout the night, with heavy mortar and artillery

fire, but the enemy never seriously threatened again, and by 0700 the next morning, the attack

was definitely over, the enemy having done no firing for 45 minutes.

The results of the attack were impressive. Thirty-seven prisoners had been taken, including a

German captain and all that was left of his company. Information given by these prisoners revealed

that the attack had been made by four companies of the Mittenwald Mountain Battalion,

supported by light field howitzers. One thousand rounds of artillery had been hurled into the

Yank front lines. The German captain in particular was amazed by the resistance he had met.

After the artillery barrage, he had expected to walk in and take the objectives without trouble.

When he found instead an aggressive enemy still firmly entrenched, he saw nothing else to do

Feb 25

17

but surrender. The Germans had thrown the best they had at the men of the 3rd Battalion and

had failed.

As the month of February came to an end, it was evident that the line was still far from static.

The 10th Division was not through advancing. The 1st of March found the 3rd Battalion still on

Mt. della Torraccia, with the other two battalions drawn up behind them in the vicinity of Gaggio

Montano.

18

n the first sunlit days of March, the 86th Mountain Infantry Regiment under the command of

Colonel CLARENCE M. TOMLINSON was firmly entrenched on the rugged peaks of Mt. della

Torraccia. From their foxholes and dugouts, the mountain fighters could look back down the

deep winding valley that leads to Silla and Porretta—territory that the Germans had only recently

commanded from these hills. To the west they could see Mt. Belvedere, conquered by

their sister regiments, the [85th and] 87th, and beyond it, the crags and rocks of Pizzo di Campiano,

Mt. Mancinello and Mt. Serrasiccia which make up Riva Ridge.

Even as they rested from their victories of February, commendations poured in. Time magazine

told the people at home of their exploits, comparing the tactics employed by the 86th 1st Battalion

against Riva Ridge with those used successfully by the English general, James Wolfe, at

Quebec during the French and Indian War. Quick praise for the 10th Mountain Division came

from Field Marshall HAROLD ALEXANDER, Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean

Theater, General JOSEPH T. MCNARNEY, commanding U.S. Army forces in the Mediterranean,

General MARK CLARK, commanding the 15th Army Group, Lt. General LUCIAN K. TRUSCOTT

of the Fifth Army, and Major General WILLIS D. CRITTENBERGER of IV Corps. And

from home came a deluge of newspaper clippings, sent by proud fathers, mothers, wives and

sweethearts. Most of these clippings brought wry smiles from the men who had battled the

Germans on Riva Ridge and Mt. della Torraccia. The newspapers spoke of “elite soldiers,” “Blue-

Blood Troops,” “Alpine Division.” Most of the men had forgotten the glamorous days of “ski

trooping.” Now they were prouder to be known as “Mountain Infantry.” They had fought from

rock to rock and tree to tree in ground combat against the enemy, and the most meaningful decoration

for them was the blue and silver Combat Infantryman’s Badge, which almost every man in

the regiment was now entitled to wear.

The last nine days of February had seen strategic peaks and territory wrested from the Germans.

The 86th’s 1st Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. HENRY J. HAMPTON, had taken Riva

Ridge, beaten off savage counterattacks for three days, and following relief, now lay in division

reserve near Gaggio Montano at Gabba. Here they set up bivouac areas and rested. Morale was

surprisingly high, “even bordering on cockiness,” according to Captain KENNETH SIEGMAN,

whose Company B had played a large and important part in the first operations.

Lieutenant Colonel TOWNSEND’s 2nd Battalion had constituted Corps reserve at Vidiciatico

throughout most of the February action, but had moved into a portion of the 3rd Battalion sector

on the line on the 26th and 27th of February. It now held the left section of della Torraccia, while

Major HAY’s 3rd Battalion had contracted its sector until it now held about half the frontal area it

had occupied during the hectic night of the 25-26 February when it had beaten off the most vicious

and determined effort of the Germans to recoup their losses. On the left flank was the 87th;

on the right flank was the third infantry regiment of the division—the 85th.

Below Gaggio Montano the regimental command post had been set up in tents in a natural

grassy bowl, protected by a ring of steep knolls. Here Headquarters Company and CP personnel

dug deep covered foxholes, for the Germans had developed a nasty habit of dropping huge shells

from 170 mm guns in the area surrounding Gaggio.

I

19

On March 1, in preparation for the continuance of operations, Colonel TOMLINSON, Lt. Col.

COOK, Capt. HARD, Capt. PFAELZER, Major ALLEN, M/Sgt. JOHN T. EVANS and M/Sgt.

WEATHERBEE LAMSON moved up to a forward OP on the slope of della Torraccia. So close

was the Command Post to the front lines that it was necessary to carry on all activities in dugouts

constructed by S/Sgt. WALLACE ROSS and his men from the regimental band. Just over the

ridge was the enemy. When told that the I & R Platoon was maintaining three observation posts,

Colonel TOMLINSON ironically ordered one of the discontinued. “We don’t need all three of

them,” he smiled, “the CP itself is an OP.” Such close-in direction of operations was characteristic

not only of the regiment but also of the division. It was a source of constant amazement to

officers and men from other outfits. One veteran quartermaster outfit officer refused to believe

his eyes when he saw the CP location. “My God,” he exclaimed, “you’d think regimental headquarters

was holding a sector of the front.”

The February operations had been only the beginning of the planned attacks on the Germans

by the 10th Mountain Division. Now it was hoped to drive north, capturing Mt. Terminale, Iola,

Sassomolare and other strategic German strongpoints. Specific objectives were laid out and designated

Able, Baker, Charlie, etc. Each company was assigned one or more of these objectives.

The success of the attack, as always, depended upon the complete and thorough cooperation of

the division, its flanking elements, the artillery, and the supporting air force. Not one echelon

could fail or the entire operation was subject to collapse.

On February 28, the battalion commanders had been oriented by Col. TOMLINSON on the

respective parts they were to play in the coming attacks. At first scheduled for early on the morning

of March 1, the operations were postponed to March 2 by division order at 1645 on February

28,. At 1805, March 2, the operation was again postponed for an additional 24 hours.

The periods of delay were not wasted. Preparations for the attack went on steadily. Aggressive

American patrols stabbed the enemy lines, probing for weak spots. Two men from Company

K, Staff Sergeant GEORGE H. DENKER JR. and Pfc. STANLEY A. SLIVON, worked their

way in behind the German lines on the night of March 1. Their aim was the capture of, or intelligence

about, a German 90 mm gun. On the route they observed a house in which there was considerable

German activity. Walking boldly up to the house, they shouted to the enemy that they

were surrounded. Six Germans surrendered. Since they were the personnel of an artillery OP,

they were able to give valuable information about the enemy defenses.

On the morning of March 2, a Company K patrol ambushed 20 Germans. That night, a G

Company patrol moved into the vicinity of C. Romito, with the mission of knocking out an enemy

stronghold in the path of the coming advance. Moving forward in the darkness, their approach

was discovered and they were met with a hail of machine gun and mortar fire. While

most of the patrol laid down a base of fire, Pfc. LEON C. WITKOWSKI and Pvt. FREDERICK J.

JUDSON JR. circled the house and approached it from the rear. Engaging the enemy, the men

drove them from the house. JUDSON kicked in the door, but the enemy inside immediately

threw out a grenade, knocking JUDSON to the ground. Another Kraut with a submachine gun

appeared around the corner of the house, but JUDSON engaged him with fire until he withdrew.

The rest of the Germans then fled the house to a covered position, suffering a number of casualties

in the process. Having cleared the house, the squad began its withdrawal. Heavy mortar fire

fell in the area, and WITKOWSKI was struck in the face. JUDSON administered first aid to him,

and then together with Technician Fifth Grade JOHN W. DICKINSON (radio operator in the

regimental I & R Platoon who had volunteered to accompany the patrol as a communications

man) remained in an exposed position to cover the withdrawal of the remainder of the squad.

Mar 2

20

The battalion commanders continued their conferences with the colonel and his staff. Ever on

the alert for the order to attack, the men sat nervously in their foxholes, cleaning weapons, checking

ammunition, and dodging enemy artillery. Captain HARD, in an attempt to make up for

losses suffered in the first phase of the attack, requisitioned replacements: 171 riflemen, 8 ammunition

and pioneer men, 5 medical aid men, and 1 radio operator. Division G-1 could only

promise 50 riflemen and 5 medics.

At 1704 on the afternoon of March 2, the uncertainty was over. From division came the order

that the operation would take place on March 3, in accordance with previous plans. The battalion

commanders were immediately notified. At 1900 Col. TOMLINSON held his final conference

with his staff. The plans were complete. Everything depended now on the men themselves.

Thus far the Germans had not been able to halt them, but the deeper the 86th pushed into enemy

territory, the more stubborn and desperate the resistance became.

The plan of attack was a leapfrog strategy. The initial attack would be made by 2 battalions.

Lt. Col. HAMPTON’s 1st Battalion on the left was to take the high ground east of Monteforte and

Hill 928. This was Objective Able. On the right, Lt. Col. TOWNSEND’s 2nd Battalion was

charged with the capture of Objective Baker: Mt. Terminale and Iola. As soon as this ground

was secured, Lt. Col. TOWNSEND’s men were to attack Objective Dog: Hill 921. From Hill 921,

the 2nd Battalion would move on to Hills 916 and 879, the two peaks on either side of Il Monte

which constituted Objective Fox, while at the same time the 3rd Battalion would move from its

reserve position to the left of the 2nd Battalion and assault Campo del Sole, Objective George. By

this time the 1st Battalion, having taken Objective Able, would be relieved by elements of the

85th Regiment and would be prepared to push through the other two battalions and launch attacks

on Sassomolare and Mt. Grande d’Aiano, Objectives How and Jig. The 1st Battalion had

relieved the 3rd Battalion two days before, so all was in readiness for the attack.

In the dim light of dawn the next morning, the fields and roads appeared deserted and quiet.

By 0630 the personnel of the rear CP were awake and waiting for the first roar of artillery. Some

men still lay in their blankets; others stepped outside their tents to watch the skies. At the front,

there had been little or no sleep all night. Now the men crouched in their dugouts gripped their

weapons and waited. On the right, many of the 2nd Battalion men “sweated out” their first big

push, since only Captain RIDEOUT’s Company F had actively engaged in the first operation, the

remainder of the battalion having been held in reserve. On the left, the 1st Battalion, seasoned

“veterans” of Riva Ridge, knew again the tightening of chest muscles, the dryness of throat, and

the hot and cold shivers, which precede the jump-off. Drawn up close behind the other two battalions

on the slopes of della Torraccia was the 3rd Battalion, commanded by its newly promoted

leader, Lieutenant Colonel HAY.

At 0640 it began—that always impressive and frightening artillery barrage. For twenty long

minutes there was not a second that a gun did not roar. Every caliber of piece available, heavy

and light, belched forth its lethal cargo over the heads of the waiting Yanks and into the front

lines and carefully prepared defenses of the Tedeschi.

Two hundred yards in front of the last Company F outposts, Sgt. WARREN D. JOHNSON

and T/5 JOHN E. SHAHAN JR. had just taken over the I & R OP. Hardly had they settled into

their covered dugout when the artillery began to whistle over their position. Suddenly, around

the corner of a nearby and supposedly deserted house, came three Germans, their hands held

high. The artillery was too much for them, and the two I & R men sent back the first three prisoners

in the day’s bag—first of a number which was to be appraised by a Corps officer as the

greatest ever taken by any unit during three days on the Italian front.

Mar 3

21

At 0700, before the last shells had landed, the men were out of their holes and advancing

across the fields. On the left, the 1st Battalion moved against Objective Able, the high ground

east of Monteforte. The forward elements of Capt. WILLIAM E. NEIDNER’s Company A moved

past Hill 1011 at 0728. Capt. SIEGMAN’s Company B paralleled their advance. Company C,

Capt. WORTH MCCLURE commanding, followed in close reserve. The advance was speedy but

by no means simple. The Germans poured artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire onto the attackers.

But the first phase of combat operations had taught the 86th a vital lesson: never let the

Germans pin you down. Keep moving. Once pinned down, you are an easy target for Jerry artillery.

Despite a hail of fire, the companies moved up.

At the same time, Lt. Col. TOWNSEND’s 2nd Battalion on the right was fighting its way up

the slopes of Mt. Terminale. Company G was assigned the mission of taking Hills 952 and 953.

The night before, in preparation for the attack, Capt. RIDGEWAY FAUST, company commander,

had led reconnaissance patrols under direct enemy observation to discover the best routes forward.

The next morning, he moved the company up these routes through mortar fire that threatened

time and time again to pin the men down and stop the advance. Capt. FAUST remained

with the first elements, directing the advance personally and by radio. The platoon led by 2nd Lt.

FREDERICK S. EYERLY JR. was the first to reach the objective. Almost immediately Lt. EYERLY

was wounded by shrapnel, but he refused to stop for medical treatment, remaining with the

company and leading his platoon throughout the remainder of the day and night.

The 2nd Platoon of Company G had been pinned down by heavy machine gun fire in the vicinity

of C. Romito (559210). Disorganized, the platoon split up, and S/Sgt. WILHART R. ETELAMAKI

found himself alone with 12 men under his command. Moving rapidly across the

slope, he personally took care of two enemy snipers. He then dispatched Pfc. MARTIN L.

MURIE and two other men to flank the machine gun that was holding up the advance. MURIE

crept to within 30 yards of the position and threw in two grenades. Without hesitating, he

moved into the nest, bayoneting two Germans and capturing four others. With the machine gun

out of action, the squad moved on to their objective, capturing some 40 prisoners.

At 0747, Company E was reported halfway up Mt. Terminale. By 0800 its forward elements

were atop the mountain, and by 0827 1st Lt. GORDON E. RANDALL had moved three of his platoons

to the top of the objective, securing the peak completely by 0840.

Supporting the Company E attack on Mt. Terminale was a platoon of heavy weapons from

Company H, led by 1st Lt. VICTOR P. CASPERSON. On the two days previous to the attack, Lt.

CASPERSON had made reconnaissance patrols to select his positions for guns. On these patrols,

he had advanced to within 100 yards of the enemy, firmly entrenched at C. Romito and la Crezia.

He then had led a third patrol into enemy territory at the base of Terminale on order to select his

targets for the attack. On the morning of the attack, when he led his platoon into position, they

were able to quickly engage the enemy and support the attack. In order to even better support

the assault, a heavy machine gun section led by S/Sgt. PHILLIP R. BERREY displaced into exposed

positions. Observers called the positions untenable, but the two squads led by Sgt.

BYRON R. WARDLE and Sgt. ARTHUR M. ARENIUS, stuck to their guns and refused to be dislodged.

The positions held. The attack went on.

The 2nd Battalion’s attacking echelons, Company E and Company G, did not hesitate on

Terminale, but moved rapidly on, while Company F assumed a reserve position on the mount.

The new objective was Dog—Hill 921. Before taking the hill, Company E was faced with the difficult

task of clearing the town of Iola which lay in the path of the advance. Company G moved

rapidly, but Company E found rough going in Iola. At 0933 they moved into the town, and at

22

1000 they were struggling in a hand-to-hand, house-to-house fight with the Germans. Company

F followed closely behind Company G on the right.

In the early stages of the attack, the 1st Battalion had expected trouble with an enemy mine

belt, but according to the first prisoners captured by Col. HAMPTON’s men, they somehow had

passed through the belt without casualty. At 0830 the battalion moved onto Hill 956. Rover Joe

filled the skies above with planes which bombed and strafed Monteforte in advance of the attacking

troops. Company A overran an enemy strongpoint at 558217, capturing fifteen prisoners. By

0937 the forward elements of the battalion had reached 558225 and were still moving forward.

The 1st Battalion CP at 544202 was under constant shellfire, as the Germans tried desperately to

halt the assault. At 1052 the final objective, Hill 928, was reached by Company A. Objective Able

was conquered. For the 1st Battalion the first phase was over.

The successful assault had been a costly one. One platoon of Company A was pinned down

for many minutes by an enemy machine gun. In an attempt to relieve the situation of the platoon,

Sgt. TORGER TOKLE, internationally known American ski jumper (he held the American

record), and Pfc. ARTHUR K. TOKOLA, a bazooka gunner, crawled into an exposed position.

Just as they fired, an artillery tree burst killed them both. But they had accomplished the mission

and the advance went on. The hill was taken and Company A began to dig in. Enemy artillery

put “typewriter” fire on the ridge, dropping shells in a staccato rhythm up and down the slope.

The forward artillery observer attempted to call down counter-battery fire but his communication

wires were out. Pfc. EVERETT R. GRIFFIN, a radio operator, left his protection in order to operate

his radio. Despite the shrapnel that whistled around him, he continued to send messages until

struck and killed. He succeeded in contacting our artillery which blasted the enemy guns and

saved the day.

Supporting the advance of the 1st Battalion was Captain ERWIN G. NILSSON’s heavy weapons

company. Time and time again, it was the merciless fire of the heavy machine guns and 81

mm mortars, which forced the enemy back. Staff Sergeant GERHARD LUST was painfully

wounded by shrapnel, but he rallied his disorganized and panicky machine gun section and inspired

them to successfully complete their mission. He refused medical aid and evacuation until

forced to return to the rear area with infection of his wounds. Sgt. LAWRENCE WHITE of the

same Company D section, though mortally wounded, continued for some minutes to command

the squad and withdraw them from an exposed area to safety. In the same action, Sgt. LEO D.

AMES was wounded and later went into shock, but he successfully moved his squad out of the

deadly fire which rained upon them.

So rapid was the advance of the troops that communication was a tremendous problem. Repeatedly

the communications sections laid wire, only to have it blown asunder by artillery and

mortar bursts. Pvt. JAMES PAYTON SR. of Company D had the job of repairing breaks in the

sound power wire between the leading rifle company, A, and its mortar support. So heavy was

the artillery that PAYTON found it necessary to repair nine breaks in the wire in the space of 20

minutes.

With Objective Able and Baker firmly secured, the attackers did not hesitate. The 1st Battalion

was speedily relieved by the 3rd Battalion 85th, and moved into an assembly area at the base

of Mt. Terminale, prepared to support the further attack of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions. The 2nd

was already moving against Iola and Hills 920 and 921, Objective Dog. The 3rd was soon to assault

Objective George—Campo del Sole. The tactics and the operation required a sort of battalion

rotation, with first one and then another battalion moving from reserve into the attack.

23

In Iola, Company E hit the toughest opposition of the day. Just as the attack began, the company

commander, 1st Lt. GORDON E. RANDALL was wounded. The executive officer, 2nd Lt.

JACK R. YOUNG, took over the company and directed its attack. He reorganized under heavy

enemy fire and moved into the town. The Germans were barricaded in every house and fought

to the last man, forcing the Americans to drive them from their holes with bayonets and grenades.

Both assault platoons advanced slowly, but the right platoon, with assistance from tank destroyer

units, moved far ahead of the left element. With both flanks exposed, the platoon was

pinned down by machine gun fire and could not advance. The artillery fell with terrible accuracy

upon the men crouched in ditches and behind low walls. Lt. YOUNG committed the support

platoon, personally leading an assault upon the enemy gun position. The platoon captured or

killed all occupants of the enemy strongpoint including an officer who had been directing artillery

and mortar on the entire area. The attack moved on, and all enemy resistance in the town

was eventually destroyed. Thirty prisoners were taken, including a German battalion commander

and his staff. The cost to Company E was terrific. Almost an entire platoon were killed

or wounded. But the town was taken.

That Iola was taken was due to the heroic efforts of many men. During the earlier attack on

Terminale, the squad leader of Pfc. HOWARD C. WELLS’s squad was wounded. WELLS took

over the squad, led them throughout the remainder of the day, and attained all objectives assigned

him. Pfc. WALLACE HEINEN saw an unmanned BAR gun, put it into action, and was

almost immediately struck by shrapnel and knocked unconscious. When, after a few minutes, he

regained consciousness, he put his gun back into action and continued to fire throughout the attack.

Pfc. EARNEL H. WARD, when his platoon radio failed to function, made his way through

heavy artillery fire to a rear area to obtain a new one and returned with it to the front line. Pfc.

ROBERT G. THIEMAN and Pfc. BERNARD HOLZER volunteered to remove four wounded men

from an evacuation jeep in the midst of heavy artillery fire. The list could go on for pages, but

one more incident only will be cited. S/Sgt. JOEL S. COFFIN alone captured six enemy and an

officer as he moved from house to house before he was killed.

The rapidity of the action made it difficult for the commanders to follow it. OP #2, from

which Captain PFAELZER was observing, displaced to the slope of Terminale at 0945. The 2nd

Battalion CP moved to 563216 at 0900. Even earlier, at 0842, OP #1 had moved up. From its new

location, Technician Fifth Grade ARNOLD C. HOLEYWELL, topographical draftsman in the I &

R Platoon, phoned a routine report to regiment. “No enemy activity at the moment,” he reported.

Just then an observant enemy sniper let go a few rounds that peppered in around

HOLEYWELL’s foxhole. “They were too damn close,” he commented. “I amended my report.”

Later in the day the Germans dropped mortar rounds on the OP. They put three shrapnel holes

through the telephone, ruined a binocular case, and broke the stock of a rifle on the edge of the

OP.

Colonel TOMLINSON followed the action closely, moving his forward CP into a hedgerow

west of Iola even before the town was taken. At 1248 he phoned his communications officer, 1st

Lt. MELVIN E. KAYLOR and ordered him to run wire to his position at 562218. This position

was the location of the new CP. The 1st Battalion CP on Terminale was at 565213.

By 1122 the first Company G soldiers were on Objective Dog. The right platoon of Company

E was just short of Tamburini, while the left platoon was held up by fire from a house that was in

the process of being destroyed by tank destroyers. At 1135 Company G consolidated its positions

on the west end of the objective and by 1223 had moved onto Hill 930. Company E was still hav24

ing trouble 250 yards northeast of Iola at 568221. Colonel TOWNSEND committed his reserve,

Company F, in the attack on Tamburini. At 1346, they pushed onto the objective, while Company

E cleared out scattered resistance near Iola.

General HAYS had ordered the 3rd Battalion pushed immediately through the other units in

order to attack Objective George—Campo del Sole. As fast as possible, Colonel HAY moved his

battalion into its assembly area. At 1530 he jumped off in the new attack. Just 22 minutes later,

the 2nd Battalion, which paused on Dog only long enough to reorganize, attacked Objective Fox:

Hill 916 and Hill 879 on either side of Il Monte.

The 3rd Battalion functioned smoothly and efficiently. At 1745 they occupied the objective,

taking two field pieces and capturing over 100 prisoners. The 3rd Battalion CP displaced forward

between 1900 and 2000. Col. HAY requested additional forward artillery observers and help

from a collecting company to take care of his casualties.

At 1800 the 2nd Battalion had moved up on the high ground of Objective Fox. Company E

reported killing two “Germans” who upon investigation turned out to be Italian women wearing

German uniforms. “I guess they forced the women to put on the clothes and go out in the street,”

commented Pfc. ALBERT EJEM. “We felt sorry as hell when we realized what had happened,

but what can you do when they fight like that?”

Scattered resistance continued at Il Monte until 2100. “We were moving so fast that the Jerries

had a hard time zeroing in on us,” said Sgt. JAMES LAWSON of Company E. “Their mortars

kept falling where we had been.” More than 200 prisoners were taken.

Nightfall. The 86th had taken five of the seven objectives assigned to it. During the night,

plans were coordinated for the morrow’s attack by the 1st Battalion against Objectives How and

Jig—Sassomolare and Mt. Grande. The attacks were to be fully supported by tanks and artillery.

Throughout the night, few men relaxed. Only too well the men remembered the vicious

counterattacks they had faced after previous gains. No one doubted that the Germans would

repeat their performance and make a desperate effort to regain the lost ground. Contact was established

between the 86th and 87th, which had moved up on the right in similar gains. Company

C of the 87th which had moved into the regimental sector, was placed under the operational

control of the 86th for the night. At 1830 the 2nd Battalion had established contact with the 85th

on the left. The defensive line tightened up.

The most outstanding thing about the first day’s operations appeared to be the number of

prisoners taken. From the time the first three Krauts surrendered to the I & R men just as the attack

started until nightfall, the prisoners came through the IPW station in a steady stream. Eighteen

were taken by the 1st Battalion in the early stages of its advance; thirty were taken in Iola by

the 2nd Battalion; 110 by the 3rd Battalion on Campo del Sole, 200 at Il Monte. They came from

diverse units, the first three being from the 11th Company of the 721st Regiment, while among

the last prisoners taken was one who said he came from the 444th Regiment, a new unit on the

front. The total count for the first day was well over 400, while the division total was near 1000.

Next morning at 0745, a new artillery barrage opened up, and at 0800 the 1st Battalion was

off again, this time toward Sassomolare. At 0839 Col. HAMPTON reported the situation progressing

well and rapidly. Companies B and C were attacking on line. At 0910 the advance was

held up just south of Hills 892 and 859 by small arms and automatic weapons fire. 1st Lt. JOHN

K. RANCK of Company B led a squad to within grenade range of the Germans. Charging the

position, the party killed one German, wounded one, and took four prisoners. Lt. RANCK con-

Mar 4

25

tinued the advance 200 yards farther, taking four more prisoners. Finally he neutralized the gun

position, personally killing the gunner while his squad finished off the rest of the occupants. Sgt.

FRANK ELKSNIN, who had been left in a rear area, crept and crawled through heavy sniper fire

to join his squad. Arriving at the assault area, he killed two Germans, helping to lift fire from his

pinned down comrades. Staff Sergeant AL ALCARAZ led his mortar section forward so as to be

able to better support the 2nd Platoon. The Germans dropped a heavy mortar barrage in the valley

that he had to cross, but he maneuvered his men across without a casualty.

By 0950 the battalion was once more moving ahead, Companies B and C were still abreast,

while Company A had not yet been committed. At 1034 the left half of the objective was taken.

Rapidly the position was overrun. Captain ROBERT KRUMM, battalion S-3, stood on a tank to

direct fire on the houses, shouting through the turret to the gunners. The Germans streamed out

of the town, and, above them as they poured along the road to Natalino, the ever-present planes

bombed and strafed.

At 1109 Sassomolare was completely ours. The battalion rapidly reorganized. Col. TOMLINSON

moved forward into that village in the midst of harassing mortar fire from the right

flank, where the 87th was still attacking the high ground of Objective King—Madna di Brasa.

When the regimental commander arrived in Sassomolare at 1130 he found that at least one of the

mortar shells had hit its mark. Lt. Col. HAMPTON, battalion commander, was badly wounded.

Since the beginning of the operation, Col. HAMPTON had flirted with injury or death by staying

constantly in the forward areas in order to direct his troops. At last his luck had run out.

When Col. HAMPTON was evacuated, Major GRAHAM ESPEY took over command of the

battalion. He was called forward from the rear CP and arrived at 1200. Immediately he and Col.

TOMLINSON planned a coordinated attack on the next objective, Mt. Grande. Company B was

to attack on the right, Company C on the left, with Company A following C. Company D was to

support from the high ground at Sassomolare. The attack was to jump off following a 27-minute

artillery preparation.

Inevitably, some things went wrong. The attack was delayed by more harassing fire from the

right flank. At 1315, 12 minutes ahead of schedule and while friendly artillery still fired, the battalion

jumped off. Despite these initial handicaps, the advance proceeded. The artillery continued

to pour heavy fire on targets of opportunity, and Rover Joe strafed the reverse slope of the

objective. By 1400 Company C was advancing up the slope of Mt. Grande. Company A in reserve,

was receiving heavy artillery. At 1525 the objective was taken. Company B took 40 prisoners

on Hill 842 and quickly dug in; Company C was on Hill 854, and Company A on Hill 879.

The battalion had taken over 100 prisoners during the day. Pfc. CHARLES LE WECK of Company

C explained the method of capturing prisoners. “Every time we got some Germans out of a

house, we’d grab the meekest looking private and make him tell us where the next bunch was.

We did that all day long.”

With Mt. Grande taken, the advance was virtually over. The 86th had accomplished its mission.

Opposition had been stiff. From 1st Sgt. DOUGLAS TRAIL of Company D came a concise

summary: “These last two days have been a bunch of hell.”

Not only at the front had the situation been uncomfortable. The Medical Detachment had

had its share of danger and hardship. Major JOHN K. MENEELY moved his men up on the first

day of the attack. Conditions of the terrain were such that it was necessary to pack all equipment

for the last four miles. The medics were shelled all the way. Some vehicles were destroyed. The

26

shelling continued without interruption for over 10 hours, while in houses and dugouts the doctors

and aid men labored over their patients.

By mid-afternoon on March 4, the 3rd Battalion held Objective George on the left of the regimental

sector, while the 1st Battalion was firmly ensconced in the right sector. The 2nd Battalion

had moved into Sassomolare just as the 1st moved out. They almost moved in too early, and 2nd

Lt. WILD, battalion S-2, found himself in the midst of the fighting. At 1515 the 2nd Battalion was

set up in Sassomolare. The entire front was tightly held.

Division G-2 warned Captain PFAELZER that the enemy was capable of counterattacking

with a strength of two battalions. Another sleepless night loomed for the men on the line. At

1545 the 2nd Battalion was ordered to tie into the left flank of the 1st Battalion and the right flank

of the 3rd Battalion. A strong patrol was dispatched to reduce the remaining resistance on the

right flank between Sassomolare and Madna di Brasa. At 1600 Col. TOMLINSON and an advance

party displaced forward to the new regimental CP in Il Monte, and at 1700 Captain

PFAELZER closed the old CP in Iola.

The expected casualties had occurred, though they were not nearly so heavy as they might

easily have been. Captain HARD requisitioned replacements from division: 8 platoon officers

and a communications officer, 200 riflemen, 43 heavy weapons men, 12 wiremen, and 5 medical

aid men.

The long night went by. At midnight, by order of Col. TOMLINSON, Major HAROLD

GREEN, executive officer of the 2nd Battalion, assumed command of the 1st Battalion in place of

Major ESPEY. The dawn came and the Germans had not attacked. Why they did not attack that

night or later remains the prime mystery of this series of battles.

The counterattack had not come on the night of March 4, but there was no guarantee that it

would not yet come; the regiment took no chances. Next day the artillery registered in all defensive

fires. Col. TOMLINSON accompanied General HAYS on a rapid ground reconnaissance of

the tactical terrain. That the Germans were still around was quite evident as seven rounds of enemy

mortar fell near the CP at breakfast-time.

In order to fill in the gap between the 1st and 3rd Battalions, the 2nd Battalion placed strongpoints:

one platoon at Natalino and one at Piani di Sotto. Outposts maintained contact with the

front-line companies.

Meanwhile, in the 1st Battalion area, Company C had found isolated pockets of enemy resistance

on Hill 954. They spent the morning cleaning out the area. 1st Lt. LLOYD O. WADLEIGH

of Company A was wounded in the hip but remained with his platoon until the mission was

complete. At 1430 they discovered that an enemy detachment had worked its way up their flank

and was now pouring automatic weapon fire upon them. This firefight was the only serious

threat that the Germans were to make in the nature of a counterattack. All afternoon it continued.

At 1630 Major GREEN reported that the position was becoming increasingly difficult to

hold due to the close proximity of the enemy. Col. TOMLINSON ordered the hill reinforced and

held. The reinforcements turned the tide, and though the battle continued for another two hours,

the Germans were eventually forced to withdraw.

Position consolidation continued, though the men were constantly harassed by enemy artillery.

Supplies were largely carried by mules. Pfc. HANS MEVES and Sgt. ROBERT A.

MCELROY of Headquarters Company 1st Battalion directed the activities of the 17th Company,

Alpini Quartermaster Mule Pack Battalion, Italian, which was attached to the 86th. The Service

Mar 5

27

Company carrying parties continued to do yeoman work, carrying supplies on their backs. Cpl.

PHIL J. GULLIFER continued to portage though he had tremendous blisters, which eventually

sent him to the hospital. Cpl. STANTON D. YOUNG was given three days rest by the medics

after exhausting himself, but he refused to take it and returned to his job. Staff Sergeant JOHN C.

THOMPSON made four trips up and down the long mountain trails without stopping except to

unload and reload. Theirs was a thankless job, but they did it well and uncomplainingly.

Captured enemy artillery, including two 88s, two 105 mm howitzers, and one 75 mm field

piece, were either removed or destroyed. Plans went rapidly forward for the laying of mine

fields in the areas 565234 and 568230. The 126th Engineers could give only technical advice; the

mines must be laid by the infantrymen. In order to further button up the front, contact was made

with the 87th on the right on the even hours all night.

At 2125 on the night of March 5, Col. TOMLINSON finally gave way to the illness that had

been plaguing him throughout the attack, and he, along with the Sergeant Major, JOHN T.

EVANS, was evacuated to the hospital in Gaggio Montano with high fever. Command of the

regiment was assumed by the executive officer, Lt. Col. ROBERT L. COOK.

In the early morning hours of March 6, it appeared at last that the Germans were preparing

to attack. Light flashes could be seen and vehicles heard at Montalto. Company A reported that

tanks to its front were bringing harassing fire to bear. Sirens could be heard, and between 0400

and 0500 a small-scale firefight broke out in the 1st Battalion area. The Americans were quick to

retaliate. Heavy artillery concentrations were fired on all possible avenues of attack. Chemical

mortar fire fell on the road junction at 588269 where enemy trucks were reported concentrated.

Air attacks on Villa d’Aiano and la Rivola were requested. But to the intense relief of all concerned,

the German attack did not materialize.

At noon on March 6 occurred one of those unavoidable tragedies which often make the headlines

at home, but which can easily be understood by anyone acquainted with the situation. The

Rover Joe planes were out again, strafing possible enemy positions. Up on the ridge and down

another the planes went, beating the ground with their machine gun fire. On the ridge running

down from Mt. Grande, the 1st Battalion men sat on the edge of their foxholes and cheered the

planes as they did their deadly work. Suddenly one plane headed directly for the 1st Battalion

positions and dived low, continuing its fire. The men below sat stunned for a moment and then

leaped for cover. Some didn’t make it. The pilot, confused by the sight of similar ridges below

him, had misjudged his terrain. He was immediately notified of his mistake.

The regiment settled down to the old familiar task of making their positions stronger and

stronger against possible enemy attack. All civilians were evacuated from the area. Company E

set up trip flares. Second Lt. PAUL E. MIZE led a Company E patrol out in the vicinity of Piani di

Sotto. The company commander, 1st Lt. GORDON E. RANDALL, organized a relief party from

the cooks, clerks, and headquarters personnel to destroy an enemy machine gun.

Division once again repeated its warning that the regiment must be on constant watch for a

counterattack. The 114th Reconnaissance Battalion, 300 “superman” strong, was now located in a

bowl northwest of Montese. This unit could either be employed for a strong counterattack or

used for a diversionary attack. But the night was a repetition of those that had preceded it. Enemy

artillery fell, but once again no attack.

With the front lines so close together, Captain PFAELZER determined to try a different sort

of warfare. With a unit from Psychological Warfare Section, he moved into the Company I area

and beamed a long propaganda harangue into the enemy lines. The most concrete reply from the

Mar 6

28

enemy was a heavy German artillery and mortar barrage on the 3rd Battalion area. Only one

German surrendered, but his report was encouraging, since he confessed that many of the Germans

who wished to surrender were prevented by fear for the safety of their families. Evidence

of the polyglot nature of the opposing forces came that same night as a Russian slave laborer escaped

from the enemy lines. Questioning by Cpl. MARTIN HAMMER, Russian-born 86th orientation

chief, elicited little information from the man, who was either stupid or afraid.

It was evident to all that offensive action for the time being was at an end. The regiment

could now settle down to what in many ways is a more nerve-wracking and uncomfortable job

than attack: the holding of a sector of the line against a constantly vigilant and watchful enemy.

That the enemy was on his guard no one could dispute. Early on the morning of March 8, an intelligence

crew from the 1st Battalion, digging in an OP, ran into heavy and accurate machine

gun fire. Intermittent machine gun fire swept the entire 1st Battalion front almost every night.

And of course the artillery continued to fall, killing one man here and wounding another there.

One officer and nine men were wounded on March 7. The men in the foxholes sweating it out,

seeing each dawn with the relieved realization that another night had passed without a shell in

their particular dugout.

To compensate for losses incurred in the drive, the regiment received the replacements it had

previously requested. On March 7, 8 officers, 42 heavy weapons men, 12 wiremen, 5 aid men and

250 riflemen reported to Warrant Officer DONAVAN A. OWEN at the rear CP. The men had a

rousing reception. Two replacements in Company B were wounded before they could be assigned

to squads.

The great advantage in material and equipment possessed by the Americans showed itself

most during the day. Not a German could move along the front without bringing down a hail of

fire, and few enemy even tried. From the OP high on a hill just above Il Monte, the observers

could look across at Montese, whose deserted streets and bomb-shattered buildings showed no

sign of life. All along Montalto, the high ridge that loomed across the valley from Il Monte and

Sassomolare, there were Germans. Everyone knew they were there because at night the machine

guns opened up from its forward slopes. To the watchers in the OP who searched the slopes

daily with high-powered binoculars, the Germans’ whereabouts were largely a mystery. Occasionally

a possible OP or gun position was spotted. Minutes later, the boom of artillery or the

pop of mortars would be heard and the position demolished. It was an unhealthy locality for

Tedeschi.

On March 9 began the shifting of troops, which was designed to give each battalion in turn a

rest from its duties on the line. At 0206 March 9, the 2nd Battalion 87th completed its relief of the

3rd Battalion 86th. At 0300 March 10, the 2nd Battalion 86th moved from division reserve into a

new sector on the right of the 1st Battalion and went into position in the vicinity of Hill 744.

The 3rd Battalion moved to a rest area at Campo Tizzoro where for the first time in days the

men enjoyed a long uninterrupted sleep and a hot shower. Mr. W. Speer, regimental Red Cross

director, had provided facilities for clean clothes, haircuts and shaves. Signs pointing to the

“Stork Club” were all over town. Coca-Cola, unrationed, was sold for a nickel a bottle. Stationery

and reading materials were easily available. Phonographs played full blast to appreciative

audiences. Deck chairs lined the sidewalks, and soldiers lolled in the afternoon sun. The moviehouses

were filled for afternoon and evening performances with an average attendance of 350 to

400 men. In the evening there were dances with signorinas and their chaperones brought in from

all the neighboring towns. Double PX rations were issued by Technician Fifth Grade RICHARD

SICCHIO, special service noncom. Many of the men drank their sixteen bottles of beer at a single

Mar 7

Mar 9

29

sitting. The men were paid, and approximately 250 men went to Florence in army vehicles to

spend the money. The men made the most of their short rest. On March 12, the battalion moved

from Campo Tizzoro to a division reserve area in the vicinity of Crocetta di Sotto.

Up on the lines some 30 miles away, the situation was unchanged. The 1st Battalion held its

original positions, while the 2nd Battalion actively engaged in patrolling. On March 11 there was

a light counterattack of the 2nd Platoon of Company A which was repulsed without casualty.

The 1st Battalion motor pool was heavily shelled, wounding one man. General DUFF inspected

the forward areas, but more important to the men was the fact that 10-in-1 rations, with their

added variety, were substituted for the tiresome C-rations.

Company C, on Sasso Baldino, beat off an enemy combat patrol on March 12, but was constantly

forced to contend with enemy snipers who infiltrated behind the lines and fired on positions

from the rear. “Let the snipers alone,” advised one GI. “They’ll keep the visiting brass

away.” Company C was fast finding that every house was heavily booby-trapped; for the first

time, the 86th had to deal with that particular German specialty. The best solution seemed to be

to stay out of the houses until they were cleared by the experts.

March 13. Pay day. What good would money do the men on the front, no one knew, but 1st

Sgt. WESLEY LASSELLE of Headquarters Company reported numerous card and dice games.

Money changed hands quickly but it helped to pass the time away. Meanwhile contact patrols

constantly maintained touch with the 85th on the right flank. Never for a minute could the outfit

relax its vigilance against attacks. This was the kind of war the 86th had first encountered back in

January around San Marcello.

Quotas of officers and men left periodically for Montecatini, Florence, and Rome. In Florence

the men strolled down the old-world streets, inspecting the cathedrals and peering curiously into

the narrow shops along the Ponte Vecchio. But it was probably the little Italian resort town of

Montecatini that the soldiers would remember longest.

Montecatini was the nearest thing to a line soldier’s dream—a wide-open town where the

MPs were tolerant, the champagne and cherry brandy flowed like water, and there were ample

facilities for amusement. Not the least of the attractions was the Club Trianon, a rowdy nightclub

with a hot swing orchestra and a shady burlesque show. The men crowded into the movies and

bars, met Montecatini’s pretty girls, took a look at its famous marble mineral baths, and generally

tried to forget all about the war.

The enemy refused to forget the war however, and the front line game of hide-and-seek went

on. Colonel TOMLINSON had quickly recovered from his illness. He spent two days touring the

hospitals with Major BOWERMAN and Major PFAELZER who had recently been promoted. The

three officers tried to see all of the regiment’s wounded personnel.

On March 14, 160 more replacements arrived. Since the regiment was now largely up to

strength, it was decided to establish a replacement pool at Service Company to supply any call

for men. At Bombiana, where Service Company was now located along with rear CP, 112 of the

men were placed in a training program under the general direction of 1st Sgt. URIEL V. CARPENTER

and Tech. 5 ARTHUR E. RILEY.

On the night of March 15-16, the 1st Battalion left the line, replaced by the 3rd Battalion,

which moved from division reserve. The relief was completed at 0042, March 16, and Lt. Col.

HAY at that time assumed responsibility for the sector. The 1st Battalion moved far back to the

division rest area at Montecatini.

Mar 11

Mar 14

Mar 13

30

German artillery was an ever-present problem. Sixty-five shells fell in the former CP area between

1200 March 17 and 1200 March 18. Just as Tech. 5 RUSSELL HUNT and Tech. 4 PETER

SCHMITT of Headquarters Company reached the front tent in the breakfast chow line, an 88

shell smacked into the side of the hill just above them. Everyone hit the ground, including the

cooks, and when the excitement ended most of the men had to go back and start their breakfast

all over again.

The front line positions were unchanged. Most patrols failed to make enemy contact. One

raiding party fought briefly with the enemy, killing one. Four Americans were wounded. Another

patrol discovered a minefield. The 2nd Battalion made contact three times nightly with the

3rd Battalion 85th.

In Montecatini on March 18, General DUFF presented the entire personnel of Lt. JAMES

LOOSE’s Company A platoon with Bronze Stars. The 39 men had made the memorable stand on

isolated Pizzo di Campiano during the February push.

On March 19 the 1st Battalion left the Elysian Fields of Montecatini to become division reserve

at Pietra Colora, closing in there at 1423. The battalion CP was established. Troop rotation

continued on March 20 when the 1st Battalion moved back onto the line, relieving the 2nd Battalion.

Relief was completed without incident at 0013.

On March 23 the touring Congresswoman, Clare Booth Luce, visited the regimental CP. She

talked to the enlisted men, had her picture taken cutting bread in the Headquarters Company

kitchen, and looked at enemy territory from the path leading to the regimental OP.

Civilians moving through the lines were a problem, but also a constant source of information.

On March 21, forty-nine civilians moved through Company A. On March 29, fifty-four Italians

and a pregnant cow made their way into the Company C sector. From these civilians and from

captured Germans the S-2 learned the positions of the German units facing the 86th. Reported on

Montalto, the ridge directly to the front of Il Monte, was the 1st Battalion of the 741st Regiment

together with portions of the 721st Regiment.

In the last days of the month, a regimental training area was set up at Prunetta. Lt. Col. HAY,

whose battalion was the first to move into the new area, made his initial reconnaissance on the

night of March 23. That same night the division order was issued which directed the 3rd Battalion

to proceed to Prunetta on the night of March 26 after being relieved by the 2nd Battalion. On

the 31st of March, the 3rd Battalion was to revert to division reserve at Pietra Colora.

As the 3rd Battalion prepared for its relief on the night of March 25, 240 rounds of artillery

fell on its positions. Casualties were heavy. In Company K, two were killed and seven wounded.

Early on the morning of March 26, the battalion S-2 requested counter-battery fire to search the

area.

The 2nd Battalion had moved from Montecatini to Pietra Colora on March 24. It now relieved

the 3rd Battalion, completing the change at 0200, March 27. As March drew to a close, the

1st Battalion was relieved by the 2nd Battalion 87th which came under the temporary operational

control of the 86th. The 1st Battalion moved to a training area while the 3rd Battalion reported to

division reserve at Pietra Colora.

Mar 19

Mar 25

31

efore coming to Naples almost every man in the 86th Mountain Infantry Regiment had seen

pictures and newsreels of the Italian campaign. Invariably they portrayed the American GI

in Italy as knee-deep in mud, plodding his way through a driving rain. Naturally this was the

kind of weather the men had expected when they entered the country. But they had been

agreeably surprised by the mildness of the climate.

Especially was this true during the first half of April—the climactic month of the war for the

10th Mountain Division. The front lines were quiet, and the men of Col. CLARENCE M. TOMLINSON’s

command stretched on the grass and sunned themselves. Of course, foxholes were

handy, for across the valley from Il Monte, Sasso Baldino, and Sassomolare—positions where the

regiment was entrenched—were the Germans of the 741st Regiment, still dangerous and unbeaten

despite the setbacks they had already suffered at the hands of the 10th Mountain Division.

With the weather so perfect and with the situation in Europe rapidly reaching its climax, it

was natural that the men would expect the beginnings of a push in Italy. All winter they had

been talking of the spring offensive, which was to wrest from the grasp of the enemy, the rich Po

Valley. The only question now was the date of “D-Day.” It was bound to come, but as the men

lolled on the Apennine hillsides, they looked upon every day of inactivity as a sort of reprieve—

one more day of grace before the jump-off.

April 1 found the 86th in a fairly static tactical situation with one battalion holding a sector of

the line, one battalion in division reserve, and one battalion in a training area. The 2nd Battalion,

under the command of Lieutenant Colonel DURED E. TOWNSEND, was on the line, having relieved

the 3rd Battalion in its positions on March 27. On their right was the 2nd Battalion of the

85th Regiment; while on the left was the 1st Battalion of the 365th Regiment, 92nd Infantry Division.

The 3rd Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel JOHN H. HAY, lay in division reserve at Pietra

Colora, while Major HAROLD L. GREEN’s 1st Battalion worked in the division training area

at Piastre, 8 kilometers southeast of San Marcello.

The policy of rotating the battalions on the line, which had been in effect through most of

March, continued. On April 4 at 0345, the 3rd Battalion completed its relief of the 2nd Battalion

and assumed responsibility for the front line sector. Major GREEN moved his battalion into division

reserve at L609219, closing into that area at 1048.

By April 6 it was evident that something big was in the wind. The shifting of sectors, which

forecasted the beginning of an operation, started as the 1st Battalion moved forward from its division

reserve area to relieve the 10th Mountain Anti-tank Battalion at Riola (L636256). This

move presaged the shift of the entire regiment into that area.

A glance at the map reveals the importance of this terrain. It encompasses the high ground to

the left of and controlling Highway 64, the principal route from the south into Bologna. Before

any viable force could move up that highway, this rugged mountainous ground would have to

be occupied by friendly forces. It soon developed that this was the primary mission of the 10th

Mountain Division in the “Big Push.”

Troop movement continued rapidly. Behind the lines, Service Company, including Replacement

Pool, S-4, Motor Pool, Post Office and the Rear Command Post, moved north of Silla

B

Apr 4

32

on Highway 64. In preparation for the coming operations, Captain DYSON DUNCAN’s Transportation

Platoon picked up 150 mules in Montecatini and led them the 60 miles up to the front

lines. The mules were vital equipment; once again the regiment consisted chiefly of men and

mules.

For the time being, the 2nd Battalion remained in its training area at Cione, near San

Marcello, while the 3rd Battalion still held the original regimental sector, extending roughly from

Sasso Baldino (L582253) to Mt. Grande d’Aiano (L582256). On April 7 the forward CP moved

from Il Monte (L580252) to Riola (L636256) and that afternoon Colonel TOMLINSON began the

series of staff meetings to orient the staff and battalion commanders on the operational plans.

In the following two days, the regiment was rapidly deployed into the positions selected for

it at the beginning of the attack. The 2nd Battalion left Cione on April 9 and moved into the vicinity

of Coniali (L624236). On April 10 the 3rd Battalion was relieved on the line by elements of the

10th Anti-tank Battalion and closed into the vicinity of Riola. The 1st Battalion was relieved in its

positions by the 6th Armored Infantry Battalion, 1st Armored Division, and also moved into bivouac

in the vicinity of Riola. The entire regiment was at this time concentrated in a small sector.

All was in readiness for the attack.

The jump-off was originally planned for dawn on the morning of April 12. Circumstances

and the weather decreed otherwise. For two to three nights preceding the scheduled assault, the

regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon had been far out into enemy territory,

searching for roads over which tanks might be employed. They had found roads destroyed or

heavily mined, roadblocks erected, defenses carefully prepared. Once, 1st Lt. DONALD E

TRAYNOR’s men had come face to face with German sentries. Quick-thinking Pfc. HERBERT

SCHNEIDER spoke to the sentry in German, and the man let the patrol pass. But no route forward

for tanks and armor was found.

The weather, too, failed to cooperate. Mild and sunny for so long, it suddenly became overcast,

cutting down the possibilities of air support. Late on the afternoon of April 11, with these

factors in mind, the attack was postponed 24 hours.

Next morning the 3rd Battalion was relieved from its responsibility as division reserve and

reverted to Colonel TOMLINSON’s command. He was ordered to move the battalion to the vicinity

of S. Maria di Labante (L639235), and Colonel HAY’s troops closed into that area at 1515.

Shortly afterward, the operation was again postponed 24 hours. Clouds still hung low and visibility

was poor.

Colonel TOMLINSON and Lieutenant Colonel ROBERT L. COOK, executive officer, made

good use of the extra time, holding almost continuous conferences with staff and battalion officers,

liaison officers and special staff officers. Over and over again the coming offensive was discussed.

Every detail had to be letter-perfect. Orders issued by every major commander in the

entire theater had made it clear that this was the supreme effort to crush the Germans in Italy.

Colonel TOMLINSON was determined that the 86th Regiment would fulfill its mission.

Only one battalion of the regiment was scheduled to be committed on the first day of the attack.

Col. TOWNSEND’s 2nd Battalion was to follow the 87th Regiment as it attacked on the

right half of the division sector. The other two battalions were to remain in reserve until the first

phase had been completed. The course of the attack was to be judged by the progress of the attacking

echelons past certain major terrain features, numbered and known as Check Points.

33

At 0758 on the morning of April 14, the uncertainty and delay was over. Division informed

Col. TOMLINSON that “H-Hour” was to be at 0945 that same morning. The artillery preparation

at 0910 would follow the air bombardment beginning at 0830. Quickly giving his final instructions

to his subordinate officers, the regimental commander and Major DAVID A PFAELZER, S-

2, left for the forward OP in order to observe and direct the action.

Promptly at 0830 the airplanes began to circle lazily over the front lines, to be greeted with

shouts and waves from the troops below. The planes moved over the valley and let loose with

firebombs over Rocca di Roffeno. Great geysers of flame and heavy black smoke rose up to 200

feet in the air, and the concussion could be felt 3000 yards away.

When the planes had finished, the artillery opened up, seemingly pounding every spot that

the Air Corps had missed. In a few moments the valley was almost completely obscured by a fog

of gray, black, and white smoke. The bursting shells started rockslides on the shale slopes of

Rocca di Roffeno, and buildings were reduced to irregular piles of rubble.

The infantry attack jumped off on time, and at 0951 April 14 the 2nd Battalion was in position

to follow the 87th across the line of departure. Col. TOWNSEND lost communication with the

supporting 605th Field Artillery and requested through regiment that the artillery continue its

devastation fire on Roffeno, his principal objective. Opposition in the 86th sector was light at

first. Once in the lowlands between the two ridges, the men moved rapidly and encountered no

Germans. They ignored heavy enemy mortar fire and at one point covered a mile in ten minutes.

By 1045 Company F was at L623275, near Torre Iussi where the 87th had met unexpectedly determined

opposition. So far there had been no complications, but by 1110 the 87th was very definitely

pinned down on Hill 860 (L619272) and the 2nd Battalion 86th was held up behind them in

the vicinity of Mt. Acquaretto (L622268).

Major JOHN E. SEAMANS, executive officer of the 2nd Battalion, contacted the 87th to learn

their plans for dealing with the impasse. He was told that the 1st Battalion 87th was to move

back off Torre Iussi and allow the artillery to lay in a new barrage on the enemy positions.

Shortly after this information was obtained, the divisional commander, General HAYS, informed

Col. TOMLINSON that the 1st Battalion 87th was to bypass Torre Iussi and head for Hill 903, fire

from which was hampering the 86th’s 2nd Battalion attack on Rocca di Roffeno. Company F was

to draw the tough assignment of cleaning up Torre Iussi after it had been flanked.

Almost immediately the 2nd Battalion began to move again toward its main objective, Rocca

di Roffeno. Company F ran into severe resistance on Hill 695 (L627269) and in Torre Iussi itself,

but by 1513 Capt. PERCY RIDEOUT’s men had cleaned up the little mountain village and were

headed toward Hill 847 (L635277), their next objective. The main body of the battalion had

moved past them, and at 1600 Capt. JACK D. CARPENTER’s Company E had captured Hill 868

(L638272) on Rocca di Roffeno. Shortly thereafter, Company F also moved onto the hill. F Company

had suffered heavy casualties—46 killed and wounded. Among the wounded was Capt.

RIDEOUT who was hit in the face with a bullet. The enemy was still resisting fiercely; only 18

prisoners had been captured by 1610 that afternoon.

As the infantry units advanced, the engineers moved in behind them to build roads and

bridges so that tanks and armor could be moved up. The enemy raked every approach route

with his artillery, hampering the work of the engineers and impeding supply. Mule trains labored

up the steep slopes. When shelling fell close to the road, the mulemen hit the ground,

holding fast to the lead rope while the mules stood placidly.

Apr 14

34

At 1622 the Corps commander, General CRITTENBERGER, called Colonel TOMLINSON in

regard to his consolidation for the night. He advanced plans for the taking of Mt. Pero in the

morning. In turn, Col. TOMLINSON called Major SEAMANS. He ordered the 2nd Battalion to

contact the 87th so as to tie up the defense for the night.

The battalion had continued the attack. Supported by fire from Company E on Hill 868,

Company F attacked Hill 847, and occupied it at 1738. By 1800 they were pushing on to Hill 846

(L637277). Company E dug in on the east slope of Rocca di Roffeno, and Col. TOWNSEND set

up his advance CP at L633272 near Le Ville.

The 2nd Battalion had suffered damaging casualties in the day’s action. Capt. RALPH LAFFERTY,

battalion S-3, and Lieutenant RICHARD BLICKENSTAFF, battalion S-2, had both been

wounded and evacuated. In addition, two company commanders, Capt. RIDEOUT and Capt.

CARPENTER of Company E had been wounded. Late on the night of April 14, 1st Lt.

TRAYNOR of I & R was sent forward to the 2nd Battalion to take over the job of S-2. The direction

of the I & R Platoon was assumed by the platoon sergeant, Technical Sergeant WILLIAM

IGLEHEART.

The night was an apprehensive one, for a strong German counterattack was expected, particularly

on Hill 868. Information from S-2 was that the enemy had all of his battalions on line,

with about 10 men in reserve for each battalion. The regimental commander ordered active patrolling

of the flanks of all positions.

The attack was to continue next morning, with the 87th carrying out its original mission, followed

by the 86th’s 2nd Battalion. Tanks had already been moved to Pradalbino (L651264) and

they were to be pushed on to Suzzano (L664281). Mt. Pero was to be taken, while the 2nd Battalion

was to eventually work forward to a predetermined assembly area. Tanks attached to the

86th were to move up to Hill 543 (L649267). This was the general operational plan for the 15th of

April.

Next morning, April 15, the preliminary artillery barrage began at 0635. Company E jumped

off in the attack at 0710 to attack Hill 840 (L641285). Moving generally northeast, they were

slowed down at Lamari (L638278). They ran into every conceivable type of German booby trap

and mine, from “Toff” glass-topped mines to mined binfuls of chestnuts. Shortly after passing

through Amore (L645283), Company E captured the company commander of the 1st Company,

756th Regiment. The German captain told the IPW interrogator, “All we have left now is our

honor, so don’t expect me to give any military information.” Nevertheless he talked, revealing to

most people’s surprise that his company had suffered heavily from small arms fire but comparatively

little from the artillery barrages.

Company F had begun its advance toward Hill 787 (L658288) at 0730. Moving only slightly

behind Company E, they were halfway up the slopes of Mt. Sette Croci by 1130. At 1138 they

were ordered to veer off to the left of Hill 787 and occupy Hill 804 (L667297). They took the hill

without casualties.

Still leading the battalion, Company E moved rapidly and at 1207 occupied their objective.

By 1330 the battalion CP had moved forward to Amore (L644282), while the supply point, slowed

up by mules, followed. In the afternoon Company E moved once again, this time due east, to

take Hill 860. Company G, which had been in reserve all day, moved on Hill 775 (L659293) at

1600, and took it 50 minutes later. Company F drove toward Hill 804 (L668299), the peak of Mt.

Mantino.

Apr 15

35

The day had been a successful one for the 2nd Battalion. They had captured 55 prisoners,

taken their objectives, and lost few of their own men, except for Company G, which ran into a

minefield at Lagazzuoli (L660292), losing 29 men.

With these objectives firmly in the hands of the 2nd Battalion, the first phase of the attack, so

far as the 86th was concerned, was over. Col. TOMLINSON, in a staff meeting at 1512, ordered

the entire regiment to displace forward. The objective was an assembly area at Ca di Bello, on the

slopes of Mt. Sette Croci. The 1st and 3rd Battalions, in reserve all day, were ordered forward.

The men in these organizations had had little knowledge of the progress of the battle. They had

rested, sunned themselves, read and played cards. Not one of them complained about the delay

in commitment.

The new regimental CP was established at L654285 at 2000 that night. The 1st Battalion

moved into an assembly area just south of Mt. Sette Croci. The night was a busy one, for the

commander sensed that they were beginning to crack the German defense. The principal obstacle

to a new advance was a heavily mined field just past the proposed line of departure. When

General HAYS delivered his attack order to Col. TOMLINSON at 0140 April 16, he directed him

to advance in the general direction of Tolè, determining his own “H-Hour” and coordinating his

own artillery support. Col. TOMLINSON informed the commanding general that his entire assembly

area, together with the road from Cereglio (L63283) to Tolè, would have to be swept for

mines before the attack. H-Hour would therefore be delayed. Sweeping had already started and

was to continue all night. All engineers were being used to facilitate the employment of supporting

armor.

The enemy was bracing himself for the coming assault. The Germans moved at least 1000

men from the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division into Vignola (L735347). These men—the 100th

Regiment—could either counterattack or set up defenses, possibly at Tolè, though the commanding

officer of the 90th Reconnaissance Battalion (German), captured early in the morning of April

13, revealed that only 60 to 70 men had been left to defend Tolè.

The mine belt delayed operations considerably. At 0800 on the morning of April 16, General

HAYS ordered the regiment to attack as soon as possible, since the 87th had surprised elements

of the 94th Division and was now on that unit’s flank. The 86th was ordered to attack if possible

before the enemy could bring up reserves.

Colonel TOMLINSON, accompanied by Major PFAELZER and Colonel HAY, went forward

on his reconnaissance. Just south of Tolè, small arms and machine gun fire opened up on the

group, and Colonel TOMLINSON was seriously wounded in the arm and back. Evacuated under

fire by the other two officers, he was carried to the hospital. Command of the regiment was

assumed by the executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel ROBERT L. COOK.

At 0955 General HAYS entered the command post to confer with Colonel COOK. He urged

the regiment to push vigorously without waiting for armored support. Col. COOK called his battalion

commanders, and by 1030 they were on their way to their battalions, prepared to begin the

attack. At 1127 the 3rd Battalion moved out, with Companies K and L on the line and Company I

in reserve. The plan of attack was for both the 1st and 3rd Battalions to attack through the 2nd,

with the 1st on the right and Col. HAY’s men on the left. The 3rd quickly moved northeast

slightly beyond Ca di Bello, followed by Major GREEN’s battalion.

At 1500 the attack finally jumped off in force. It proceeded rapidly as resistance was bypassed

and the Germans appeared disorganized. A German tank pinned down Company L, but

a flanking element quickly disposed of the tank with a bazooka and anti-tank grenades. More

Apr 16

36

serious opposition was encountered at Monzuno (L683337) where both K and L Companies were

held up by small arms, two self-propelled guns, 88s and a tank. Planes knocked out the position,

and the advance went on. Check Point 30, Monzuno, was taken at 1945, and the 3rd Battalion

dug in. The entire advance had been made without armored support, though the battalion had

continually called for that support during the advance. All efforts to move armor up had been

delayed by slides and craters in the road.

The 1st Battalion had made rapid advances also. Company A had reached its final objective,

la Predosa (L685331), at 2030, having taken 26 prisoners. Company C advanced two and a half

miles without casualty, captured 5 prisoners, and occupied its objective at Coste (L685331). The

2nd Battalion, in regimental reserve, following the other two units, advanced slowly and easily to

the vicinity of Locari Scuola (L664303) where it halted and dug in.

The new regimental CP was established on Hill 832 at L666304 by 1630. At this point, Major

PFAELZER oriented the commanders of the 751st Tank Battalion and the 701st Tank Destroyer

Battalion on the next day’s attack. At the conclusion of the day’s advance, the enemy was in a

position to exert pressure on the regiment’s left flank and Major ALLEN ordered the 751st tanks

to move up on the left so as to relieve this pressure. In order to accomplish this movement, one

squad was ordered back from the 1st Battalion position at C. Bartolani (L373323) to meet the

tanks at Check Point 28 at Bacucchi (L367320) and guide them forward.

During the night, the officers were briefed on the continuation of the push scheduled for the

next day. The 3rd Battalion had established its CP at L684336, and was to launch its attack from

that position in coordination with the 1st Battalion at 0630. The 2nd Battalion was to follow the

1st Battalion to the crossroads in the vicinity of Check Point 31, then seize the high ground northeast

of Montepastore (L712340), Check Point 36.

The attack on the morning of April 17 was beautifully planned and coordinated with precision.

The 3rd Battalion crossed its line of departure at 0630 and advanced 800 yards in the next

24 minutes. Rover Pete, the air support for the regiment, rocket-bombed and strafed all roads

leading north, catching fleeing Germans in their trucks and wagons and scattering wrecked vehicles

along the roads. By 0715 Company K, commanded by Capt. FREDERICK DOLE, had taken

Check Point 35. Company I was slightly east of Check Point 35.

By 0846 Company A had reached Check Point 31 and Capt. KENNETH SIEGMAN’s Company

B was on Check Point 32. Fifty prisoners had been taken, many of them from the 190th Reconnaissance

Battalion of the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division, who said that they had only arrived

in the area the night before. The 1st Battalion sent out strong patrols to its front as it advanced

forward.

By 1000 April 17, the 2nd Battalion had moved from its reserve position to occupy the town

of Montepastore. The Germans withdrew from the town, and as they fled, were strafed and

bombed. Two hundred prisoners were taken. Captain RIDGWAY FOUST and Company G were

the first into the town, accompanied by the battalion commander, Colonel TOWNSEND. As

Colonel TOWNSEND moved among his men, supervising the defense set up around the town, he

was hit by artillery fragments and seriously wounded. Command of the battalion went to the

executive officer, Major JOHN E. SEAMANS. Captain RIDGWAY FOUST was killed later at

Montepastore while shooting azimuth on an 88 firing direct fire.

An hour after troops entered Montepastore, the first civilians were returning, greeting the

Americans warmly, finding the medics if they had wounds, and estimating the damage done to

their homes by artillery. The troops were incredibly weary. The 2nd Battalion had been continu-

Apr 17

37

ally in motion for four days. Wherever the men dropped their packs, they fell asleep. In the

town they slept in barns, cow stalls, bedrooms, anything they could find. After a rest, they

looked for food, found chickens and onions, captured German cheese and bologna. Fires sprang

up all over town, and soon the men were eating their first food, other than K-rations, in four

days.

At 1053 the 1st Battalion halted its advance for the time, setting up a CP. It had advanced

with no organized resistance other than snipers, and had suffered only one casualty. The 3rd Battalion

CP was established on Check Point 35.

At noon the advance began anew. The 1st Battalion pushed on to la Palazzina, then to the

high ground at Check Points 38 and 39. By 2015 on the night of April 17, Company A was on 38

and 39; Company B was on 34 and 37, while Company C was on Point 33. Captain WILLIAM E.

NEIDNER’s Company A had captured 63 prisoners, while so many PWs had fallen into the

hands of Company B that they were simply disarmed and sent to the rear without guards. Four

hundred prisoners were in the regimental cage. Many of these men were from the 361st Regiment

of the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division, marking yet another regiment which had been

crushed by the advance. As a result of the day’s attack, the regiment now held Hills 701, 695, 660,

690, Mt. Vignola, Mt. Tramonto and Poggio Castellarso.

Plans were afoot by now for the relief of the 1st Battalion by the 337th Infantry Regiment of

the 85th Division, which was moving up on the right flank of the regiment. At 2125 on the night

of the 17th, two officers from that outfit met with Colonel COOK to discuss plans for relief and

boundaries. Captain DONALD MARBURG, assistant S-3, was sent with them as guide to the 1st

Battalion, and the relief was consummated.

The attack was gaining momentum now. Every day brought the troops closer to the longsought-

after Po Valley. Already the peaks were a little less rugged. But hard fighting remained

before the Germans were to be pushed out of the Apennines. In the early hours before dawn on

April 18, the CP displaced from its position to Casa Costa. The attack plan for the day was given

to the battalion commanders by Colonel COOK. The 3rd Battalion was to attack from its position

on Check Point 35 towards Objective 61 in the vicinity of Monte San Pietro. From its area 1000

yards north of Montepastore, the 2nd Battalion was to drive towards Check Point 63 at Mt. San

Michele. The 1st Battalion was to attack from Vignola towards Check Point 45 at San Chierlo. At

that point they would hold up until flanked by the other two battalions, reverting then to regimental

reserve. This plan placed the 3rd Battalion on the left, the 2nd on the right, and the 1st

roughly in the center.

Colonel HAY’s men began to move at 0900 on the morning of the 18th. At first they advanced

rapidly with little or no opposition. Italians reported that the Germans had pulled out the

night before. Only three prisoners were taken, and for a time it appeared that the Italians had

been right. Then at 1110, near Check Point 50, the battalion eliminated slight resistance. Insignificant

as it was, this resistance signaled the beginning of another determined stand by the enemy

forces. At 1210 the point of the battalion advance was stopped 300 yards northwest and 400

yards west of Check Point 50 by heavy mortar, artillery, and machine gun fire. As Colonel HAY

maneuvered his men into the attack, the supporting elements speedily coordinated their efforts.

Rover Pete was requested to strafe and rocket the road running northeast from Point 62. Lt.

Colonel JAMES P. PEARSON JR. of the 605th coordinated his artillery fire so as to secure maximum

support of the 3rd Battalion. Receiving heavy artillery fire from the direction of C. Barlete,

Colonel HAY requested an air OP to search for gun positions there.

Apr 18

38

By 1430 the troops were once more pushing slowly forward. Tanks were employed extensively

and were running low on ammunition. At 1703, Major ALLEN ordered the 1st Battalion to

consolidate for the night’s defense and make contact with the 2nd Battalion on the right. At this

time the 3rd Battalion was 600 yards short at Check Point 50 and set up its CP at Salarolo

(L702385).

From Montepastore, Major SEAMANS’ 2nd Battalion had crossed its LD [Line of Departure]

(L718364) at 1020 on the right of the 1st Battalion. The first part of the advance was similar to that

of the 3rd Battalion, with no resistance encountered. At 1330 the 2nd Battalion was even with the

3rd Battalion, which had just begun its assault on the German main line of resistance. The head

of the battalion column was at L712392. At this point, the enemy opened up from the high

ground. The battalion S-3 called for artillery fire to relieve the pressure. During the remainder of

the day, the two front-line battalions moved forward slowly abreast. By 1645 the 2nd Battalion

was generally between Check Points 44 and 51, running from L710388 to L718388. The bulk of

the troops remained in this area, but Company F, under Lt. FRANK B. FOSTER, pushed on to

Objective 52 (L723397) before halting. The men, veterans by now, rode tanks into the attack, talking,

smoking cigarettes, resting. Major SEAMANS’s Company G moved on line with Company E

behind Company F and consolidated for the night. Company G’s move forward was accomplished

only after some hand-to-hand fighting in which Germans were bayoneted and driven

bodily from their houses. After they reached their area, Major SEAMANS established his CP at

L730403.

In the initial attack plan, the 1st Battalion had been assigned the task of attacking San Chierlo.

Major GREEN commenced the advance at 1130. At 1240 his troops entered Borgo, just 300 yards

southwest of Check Point 45, and at 1325 they moved into San Chierlo. Having accomplished

their mission, the battalion reverted to regimental reserve, and Major ALLEN ordered them to

clean up the area from their position north to the main highway running east and west. They

were to contact Company F on the left flank and consolidate for the night. They slept that night

in the vicinity of L731374.

Twice that day the regimental CP had displaced forward, first to Montepastore at 1040 and

then to Pilastrino at 1623. This rapid movement of the regimental command post was but a sample

of what was to come, once the attack became a rout.

For three straight days, the 86th had been in the attack. On April 19, therefore, they reverted

to division reserve. The 1st Battalion of the 85th passed through the 2nd Battalion 86th, while the

1st and 3rd Battalions of the 87th were to move through the 3rd Battalion 86th. The regiment was

ordered to assemble between Badia di Sopra and Mo. Oca, in the vicinity of L714396, and then

proceed northwest along the main road in the rear of the attacking echelons.

Captured Nazis revealed that the 2nd and 3rd Battalions had come to grips the day before

with the famed 200th Regiment of the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division. Made up of fierce and

determined fighters, the regiment had battled our armor to the last man and had to be machinegunned

out of houses that had already been reduced to piles of rubble by shelling. This was the

organization that had covered the German withdrawal from Sicily. It had high morale, tradition,

and reputation.

In order to furnish a mobile reserve for the division, the 1st Battalion was mechanized with

Quartermaster trucks. The mules, having outlived their usefulness, were sent to the rear. The

entire regiment was rested as much as possible to prepare for an all-out push into the Po Valley

Apr 19

39

on April 20. Many of the men got little rest however, as the Germans continued to rain mortar

and artillery fire on the rear areas.

By 1500 on the afternoon of April 19, the forward regiments had broken up the enemy resistance,

and the 86th received its orders for the next phase. The regiment was to move up to the

left flank of the 85th Regiment at Ost (L779455). There the regiment would move into line with

the 1st Battalion on the right, the 3rd Battalion to the left, and the 2nd Battalion in reserve, echeloned

to the left rear. The direction of attack was northwest, and its ultimate aim was to break

into the Po Valley and cut Highway 9, one of the main supply routes from the north to Bologna.

At 1800 the regiment began to move forward. The situation was extremely fluid, for the

whole front was breaking up. The road was crowded with vehicles and marching soldiers, and

the white dust filled the air so thickly that at times it was difficult to see. The regiment seemed to

be in good spirits; the men laughed and joked as they marched. They carried their rifles, ammunition,

and little else. Some wore handkerchiefs around their noses and mouths to keep out the

dust. Others were stripped to their underwear. The long columns moved steadily on until, at

2100, the I & R Platoon, which was serving as the point of advance, was halted 200 yards south of

Check Point 77 by artillery fire. Shortly thereafter, the battalions were ordered into bivouac areas

for the night: the 1st Battalion in the vicinity of Rosario (L760434); the 3rd at Campo Tradito

(L754429); and the 2nd at Bell Aria (L750415). The regimental CP closed into l’Ospitale (L749411),

Colonel COOK and Major ALLEN immediately left for division to receive the General’s order

for the attack, and at 0300 April 20, the regimental commander oriented his battalion commanders.

The regiment would attack due north, 1st Battalion on the right, 3rd Battalion on the left.

Each battalion would be supported by a platoon of tanks and a platoon of tank destroyers. The

regiment would move through the 85th Regiment.

Colonel COOK established his OP in a church steeple in San Lorenzo in Collina (L755464).

From this point he could observe and direct the first phases of the attack. H-Hour, after two

postponements to give the men much-needed rest, was set for 0830.

The 3rd Battalion on the left jumped off on time from Check Point 76 at C. Peli. In a half-hour

they advanced 1300 yards without resistance. Then a light artillery barrage fell, followed by enemy

machine gun fire. American tanks moved up to fire on the positions.

The 2nd Battalion cleared its LD at 0930 and moved out 800 yards behind the 3rd Battalion.

The 1st was moving steadily ahead on the right. By 0958, all troops were 2700 meters north of 76.

The OP at San Lorenzo was closed and Colonel COOK returned to the CP.

The slow but steady advance of the past few days was beginning to develop the proportions

of a wild chase. Armored reconnaissance vehicles were ordered to advance in front of the regiment

and seize the bridges, holding them until the infantry reached them. Tanks were also to

precede the infantrymen.

At 1130 April 20, the Po Valley was in sight from the 3rd Battalion position 1000 yards north

of Check Point 81. From the top of C. Tadolino, the last ridge in the Apennines, the troops looked

down on mile after mile of fertile green valley stretching below them. The haze of artillery smoke

obscured the view, but many of the houses appeared undamaged by shellfire. “Going into the Po

is just like coming down from Hale into Denver,” opinioned one 3rd Battalion medic.

The 1st Battalion moved into the valley at noon, and was quickly joined by the 3rd. At 1634,

Company A was in Martignone. All of the 1st Battalion had passed Prati. The advance was going

like wildfire. Strong armored support moved with them. At 1500 the 1st Battalion cut High-

Apr 20

40

way 9, severing the main supply route to Bologna and dooming that outflanked city. Thirty

minutes later, the 3rd Battalion also crossed the highway reaching a point 1000 yards northwest

of Check Point 32 at San Lorenzo. By late afternoon, the regimental CP, moving and closing behind

the forward elements, was also in the valley and at 1720 it closed into Ponte Ronca. An hour

later, the CP moved up to San Almaso. Remaining there only 25 minutes, it was moved again to

Castellaccio.

The magnitude of the breakthrough was difficult to comprehend. The enemy line had been

wrecked. After the first stages of the attack there had been little opposition. The 1st Battalion

had advanced 13 miles in 5 hours. Companies A and B had each taken 85 prisoners, besides field

guns and truckloads of equipment. As night fell, Major GREEN settled his tired men in the vicinity

of Cartara.

During the day, the 3rd Battalion had hit nothing more formidable than occasional enemy artillery.

Colonel HAY had his men dig in in the vicinity of Ponte Samoggia. Company K alone

had taken 138 prisoners and four field guns.

Germans, left behind in the rush to retreat, were eager to surrender. Pfc. RAYMOND

ALPERT of Company B started back to the division stockade with one prisoner, and ended up

with sixteen. The others “just accumulated” as he walked along. One prisoner who spoke English

was quite willing to talk. He had been with an artillery outfit. When the Yanks broke into

the valley, the German artillerymen were told they were now infantry. They were taken completely

by surprise, amazed at the rapidity of the American advance.

The Italians in the Po Valley were for the most part completely and deliriously happy.

Crowds stood at every crossroads, cheering wildly and presenting the amazed GIs with wine,

eggs, milk, and bread. Young girls pelted the “liberators” with flowers. It was a day most men

in the 86th would never forget.

The race had just begun. The regiment was ordered to advance on an azimuth of 350 degrees

during the first phase of the day’s attack, and on an azimuth of 335 degrees thereafter. The 1st

and 3rd Battalions were to move abreast and seize the bridge at Bomporto north of Modena. The

2nd Battalion, now completely motorized, was released to the control of Brigadier General

ROBINSON E. DUFF as the striking infantry of his task force.

After orienting Major GREEN and Colonel HAY on the attack, Colonel COOK moved his CP

to Ponte Samoggia, arriving there at 0858.

The battalions began to move out at approximately 1100 on the morning of the 21st. The I &

R Platoon men were placed at the heads of the attacking columns to maintain contact between

them. The 2nd Battalion rolled ahead in its trucks, while the other two groups walked. BY 1230

the I & R men, in their machine gun-manned jeeps, were 400 yards west of Check Point 54 and

had met no resistance. They were ordered to pick out a new CP and send a guide back to the old

one.

The advance was rapid, although the troops at this stage were growing increasingly footsore

(and wounded). The procession as they advanced grew more and more weird because of the odd

assortment of German vehicles (trucks, motorcycles, Volkswagens, busses, kitchen trucks, and

Fiats) that the Americans collected as they advanced. They also picked up riding horses, draft

horses, wagons and carts of all sizes and shapes. The infantrymen hitched up the horses and

went whooping on towards the objective. Many men had large blisters on their feet, but they

Apr 21

41

kept on walking. They knocked out snipers, and encountered some direct artillery fire, but kept

advancing.

The 1st Battalion, which had moved out slightly behind the 3rd, pulled up even with it at

1300 near Check Point 54. Division reported that other regiments were meeting Fascist opposition

and warned the troops to be on the lookout for Fascists either in Italian uniforms or disguised

as Partisans.

At 1410 the CP displaced forward to San Bartolo, arriving there at 1432. Our forward elements

were now in the vicinity of Ragni. So fast had the advance become that the I & R Platoon

no longer had contact with either battalion. They were ordered to patrol north and south until

they made visual contact.

Great numbers of prisoners were being captured, perhaps because it was easier to surrender

than keep walking. The Germans had very little gasoline and their vehicles were being bombed

and strafed on the roads. By 1500 the 3rd Battalion had taken over 300 prisoners. Unable to

guard them, they sent the prisoners back guarded by men from the 337th British Artillery Regiment.

Again the regimental CP displaced forward, this time to Bomporto, the final objective of the

day’s push, arriving there at 2020. The regiment had expected to find the bridge over the Panaro

River at this point destroyed, but it was still intact and the regiment crossed. The engineers

pulled dynamite charges from under the bridge; the Germans had had no time to demolish it.

The 2nd Battalion under General DUFF had sped straight to Bomporto in a whirlwind

twenty-mile dash, capturing dozens of prisoners. The 1st and 3rd Battalions had moved 12 miles.

The 1st Battalion had stopped finally at Ravarino, while the 3rd Battalion was nearby at Casoni.

The plan of strategy for the attack on the 22nd of April was designed to reach the Po River

and secure a bridgehead across it. The 2nd Battalion, still on trucks, was to leave at 2200 on the

night of the 21st, and speed down the main road to San Benedetto on the Po River, setting up

strongpoints at each bridge on the route of advance. The 3rd Battalion was to entruck at 0415 and

proceed along the route secured by the 2nd. The 1st Battalion was to follow on foot until picked

up by the 3rd Battalion trucks on a shuttle basis.

The attack went as planned. At 0920, April 22, the 3rd Battalion passed the 2nd. The regiment

was once more on the move and the CP displaced forward. Up ahead, Colonel HAY found

the bridge at Check Point 61 destroyed. He reconnoitered and found an alternate route forward.

At 1037 the battalion ran into four enemy tanks supported by riflemen. Two of the four tanks

were destroyed, and the riflemen driven off or captured. The advance went on. By 1130 the battalion

had reached L630859. The one force of German armor was the only real resistance so far

encountered.

Meanwhile, the regimental CP had moved to San Pietronella, closing in there at 1145. They

had followed closely on the heels of the 3rd Battalion and had been followed in turn by the 2nd

and 1st Battalions, whose forward elements were by this time at L648280. From time to time, intermittent

firefights broke out along the column, but nothing seriously disturbed the movement

forward until the column approached the bridge. The span was partly blown; jeeps could pass

over but not trucks. Engineers went to work immediately, and by 1350 loaded trucks were rolling

across the bridge.

At the CP, which had moved to L632862, the staff watched anxiously as the advance elements

neared the Po River, wondering where the Germans would make a stand. Their calculation and

Apr 22

42

planning was temporarily interrupted as the CP was strafed by an American plane. Yellow

smoke grenades popped everywhere, the sign of friendly troops. The 3rd Battalion, located at

L600855, was having trouble with friendly planes too, and wanted the Air Corps notified of their

position.

In the late afternoon, the CP took off on a series of quick moves designed to bring the command

post up with the troops. At 1745 they were at L585866. Their stay lasted less than an hour,

and at 2000 they established a CP at Castell.

As the long convoys wound their way through the Italian countryside, some of them were

bound to run into trouble. So rapid was the sweep that formidable bodies of enemy troops were

still operating in the rear areas. At 1950 on the night of April 22, the 1st Battalion encountered

fierce enemy resistance at the crossroads. The Germans allowed much of the convoy to pass,

then attacked with bazookas and machine guns just as the rear of the battalion pulled past them,

scattering the convoy. Two enemy tanks then rolled forward and fired on the convoy, destroying

jeeps and trucks. An American self-propelled gun, sent forward from the rear, failed to damage

the tanks. 1st Lieutenant GEORGE AMMON of Company B organized the scattered elements of

three companies into a firing line, with the help of Staff Sergeant JOHN WINCHESTER of Company

B. Lt. AMMON then led a group of men, including Pfc. PAUL CLARK of Company B, 1st

Sergeant EMERY MIDGET of Company D, and Pfc. JAMES L. GLAZIER of Company D, in a successful

effort to drive the exposed vehicles back to safety. Effective mortar fire, directed by 2nd

Lieutenant FRANK D. YUENGLING JR. and Staff Sergeant DAVID L. MEYER of Company D

drove off the German riflemen, and the tanks eventually withdrew. Some fifteen Germans were

killed in the firefight, which lasted over four hours.

The battalions once again settled down into bivouac: the 1st at Varagna, the 2nd near Moglia,

and the 3rd Battalion in that same area. The advance had moved 13 miles. One of its most noteworthy

accomplishments was the capture of 20,000 gallons of wine by Company K.

The advance was continued on the 23rd of April without incident. By noon the entire regiment

had reached San Benedetto on the Po River. The CP closed in there at 1245. Here the regiment

was in reserve to defend the south bank of the river, while the other two regiments established

a bridgehead across the river. The battalions remained in readiness to cross the river on a

two-hour notice. Colonel HAY was designated regimental executive officer, and Major WILLIAM

D. DRAKE assumed command of the 3rd Battalion.

In the brief interval caused by the stop in San Benedetto, the regiment received replacements

and the men rested. In spite of the bright moonlight, enemy planes strafed and bombed the bivouac

areas. The rest was short-lived. At 1900 the 10th Anti-tank Battalion relieved the 86th in its

defensive positions and the regiment prepared to cross the river. The 3rd Battalion was to go

first, followed by the 2nd and 1st in that order. Captain DAVID ROSENDALE, adjutant, Sergeant

DARREL C. STEBBINS, and Sergeant WILLIAM HAGERMAN formed the advance party

to establish a CP. They left at 2000. Colonel COOK, Major PFAELZER, and Captain MARBURG,

accompanied by their radio operator, T/5 JOHN E. SHAHAN JR., followed them at 2340. The

3rd Battalion was across at 0630; the 2nd at 0830; and the 1st by 1000. The crossings were made in

assault boats and DUKWs and were largely without incident. Only the 2nd Battalion drew slight

artillery on its left flank.

Still in division reserve, the regiment set up defense areas in the vicinity of Governolo. By

1105 on April 24, the regiment had received its new assignment from the divisional commander.

The 86th was to spearhead the drive toward the historic old city of Verona. Capture of the town

Apr 23

Apr 24

43

would cut one of the major escape routes of the German troops still in northwestern Italy, Attacking

at dawn on the 25th, the regiment was to advance in a mechanized column along the main

highways north, bypassing airfields at Mantova and Villafranca. Supported by the 13th Tank

Battalion, the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, and the 751st Tank Battalion, Company B of the

126th Engineer Battalion, and the 1125th Armored Artillery Battalion, the regiment was to be

completely motorized, utilizing captured German vehicles. It was planned to attack and seize

Verona, holding that city until the arrival of other elements of the division. For the operation, the

86th would constitute the striking infantry of a task force under the direction of Colonel WILLIAM

O. DARBY, former commanding officer of the famed Rangers.

The afternoon was spent coordinating plans, resting and ferrying troops across the river,

where the bridge was still under construction. It was this bridge that was to delay the attack on

Verona. Armored support was essential to the success of the operation, and the bridge was not

finally fit for passage of heavy tanks and artillery until 1430 on the afternoon of April 25. Not

until 1612 was the regiment ready to move out. At 2045, near Check Point 46, the armored elements

joined the waiting infantry, and the thrust toward Verona began. By 2330 the regiment

was in striking distance of the city. The regimental CP closed into Castelfranco. Civilians reported

that there were no organized combat units in the city and that most permanent garrison

personnel had been evacuated.

The advance into the city was largely without opposition. At 0820, the 2nd Battalion entered

the suburbs of Verona. They had made slight contact with the enemy only once, at Check Point

71. They found the bridges across the river below Verona blown by retreating Germans. Bridge

No. 7 was the least badly damaged, and engineers began work on it immediately. The 2nd and

3rd Battalions aggressively mopped up the town, and the 2nd opened its CP. But the advance

did not stop. The 1st Battalion was assigned the mission of crossing the river with tanks, tank

destroyers and artillery. They were to establish a bridgehead on the opposite side, seizing the

town of Bussolengo. Major GREEN started his men across at 1100. Once over the stream, the

soldiers loaded on tanks and pushed into Bussolengo. They took a few prisoners, including a

Czech colonel and his staff, but the bulk of the German force had pulled out. When the battalion

settled down in bivouac, they did not even dig foxholes for the first time in weeks.

Verona and Bussolengo were badly damaged by American bombings. Fascists had scrawled

on the destroyed buildings “Opera de liberatore” (work of the liberators). But most of the people

seemed glad to see the troops and anxious to find out whether they were American or English.

The Germans had told them that the English would destroy everything, but they evidently said

little about the Americans. Italian flags hung from the windows, and bands of Partisans roamed

the city, picking up Fascists and carting them off to jail. One group brought to Company K a man

dressed in Italian clothes but suspected of being German. First Sergeant EDWARD MELVIN said

“Hands up!” in German. The man obeyed, and was quickly taken to the PW stockade.

With Bussolengo taken and the Germans evidently still in headlong flight, there was no reason

to stop. The 1st Battalion was ordered to push forward to Fornace with the 1st Battalion 85th.

The 2nd Battalion moved from Verona to Bussolengo and went into bivouac. The 3rd remained

in position in Verona until relieved by the 85th Division, and then they too moved to Bussolengo.

By the night of April 27, the entire regiment was near Bussolengo. Plans were quickly formulated

for the push across what remained of the Po Valley and into the foothills of the Dolomites. For

this action, the division was to advance as a unit. Each regiment was to march 8 hours, then rest

16, while the other two regiments passed through. In this manner the troops would move north

along the shores of Lago di Garda.

Apr 25

Apr 26

Apr 27

44

Late on the night of April 27, the regiment entrucked and moved north. The CP displaced

with the troops. By 0330 the 86th had contacted the 85th. Detrucking, the regiment continued the

advance on foot. No trouble was encountered until 0500 when a destroyed culvert held up the

march. The regimental CP was set up at that point.

By this time, April 28, the regiment had advanced well into the mountains. It was here on the

shores of the beautiful Lake Garda that the Germans had elected to fight their delaying action.

The road ahead led through a series of tunnels, around which elaborate defenses had been established.

The tunnels were prepared for demolition and much of the road had been destroyed. It

was an ideal place for the German stand. The road ran directly along the shore of the lake, and

above the road soared sheer cliffs, hundreds of feet high.

At 0845, as the 2nd Battalion, the leading element, approached Tunnel No. 1, the Germans

exploded their demolitions and destroyed the tunnel, cutting off all further progress by the road.

Prisoners taken by the 2nd Battalion revealed that the tunnel was held by 50 to 70 SS men, reinforced

by a company of marines and infantry. To add to the confusion, enemy artillery moved

down on the opposite shore of the lake and fired across it onto the American forces on the road.

Colonel HAY’s orders rushed tank destroyers to the scene and their fire silenced many of the enemy

guns.

An attempt was made to send Company K around the tunnels on the ridge to the east, but

the terrain proved so formidable that progress was extremely difficult and slow. At 1235, Division

decided to send the 86th on its first amphibious operation. The tunnels were to be flanked

by troops in assault boats and DUKWs.

By 1410, seven DUKWs carrying 1st Lt. PETER J. BORCUK and Company G were in the water.

More followed rapidly. From across the lake, German 88s opened up on the boats. An airburst

killed two men in one boat; there were no other casualties. The shells threw up geysers of

water fifty feet high, and the men crouched low in the boats “sweating them out.”

The amphibious operations were successful. Slowly and carefully, the tunnels were cleared

of resistance. Only No. 1 and No. 6 had been blown, but the road between No. 1 and No. 2 had

been destroyed. The approach to Tunnel No. 1 had been booby-trapped. A wire, attached to a

bazooka, stretched across the road.

By 1530, tunnels 1, 2, 3 and 4 had been cleared of resistance, and the 2nd Battalion, having

moved around the blockade, was attacking Tunnel No. 5. By this time, the Germans had blown

the road between No. 4 and No. 5. They were prepared to blow Tunnel No. 5, but the charge

evidently exploded prematurely, killing at least 15 Germans. The advancing troops picked their

way gingerly over the carnage.

At 1930 a new CP was opened in Tunnel No. 3 (A561967). From this point, Colonel COOK

directed the difficult advance along the shore of the lake. Just after midnight, April 29, he ordered

the regiment to continue its advance toward Brione (580053). At 0220 the regimental CP

moved forward to Piano di Tempesta (A562987).

At 0440 on the morning of the 29th, troopers of the 1st Battalion climbed the hills above the

lake and moved north toward Nago. In order to maneuver in the rugged terrain, Major GREEN

had to lead his troops back a considerable distance and then forward again over the ridges and

peaks. The mountain training of the men served them in good stead.

At 0600 the 3rd Battalion jumped off. The troops moved through Tunnel No. 6 with little or

no trouble. By 1000 the rear of the 3rd Battalion and part of the 2nd Battalion Headquarters had

Apr 28

Apr 29

45

reached Tunnel No. 5. The north end of that tunnel looked directly across the lake and into Riva

(A549042), a German strongpoint.

With direct observation on the tunnel, the Germans tried for a lucky hit—and got it. They

sent out three airbursts. The first two landed to either side of the tunnel. The third went ten

yards into the tunnel, and then exploded. The concussion was terrific, ripping out both ends of

the tunnel. Shell fragments ricocheted off the walls and the blast threw bits of rock that were as

deadly as the shrapnel. Men who weren’t hit were dazed. Amid the smoke and dust, the agonized

cries of the wounded filled the air. Men crawled from the tunnel on their hands and knees,

over the bodies of other men. Captain LAWRENCE ELY of Company H was killed immediately,

along with four other men. Approximately 50 men, mostly from Company M, were wounded.

Supplies, ammunition, artillery, everything was being moved up by DUKW. German SP

[self-propelled] guns in Riva kept up a constant barrage on the lake. The water was rough, and

the speedboats used to evacuate the wounded had rough going. Rover Pete threw all their power

at Riva. The Germans had guns hidden behind hospitals, but the 1125th SP artillery picked out

the flashes and put direct fire on the position.

By noon the going was considerably rougher. Two battalion commanders, Major DRAKE

and Major SEAMANS, were wounded and evacuated. Captain CARPENTER took over the 2nd

Battalion and Captain EVERETT C. BAILEY of Company L assumed command of the 3rd. By

1230 3rd Battalion patrols were in Torbole (A577025). The 1st Battalion was 1000 yards short of

Nago (A589032). The 2nd Battalion was in reserve.

The Germans were fighting fanatically and bitterly for Nago and Torbole. The advance was

measured in yards. The Germans employed all of their available tanks and armor. Company I

was held up by 2 tanks northeast of Torbole at A582028. At 1752 the Germans moved up SP

guns, firing point blank at the troops. Both battalions were driven back approximately 800 yards.

Artillery was called down and the battalions reorganized to attack again. At 2015 the attack began

anew. This time the Germans did not hold. Despite fierce resistance, Company I pushed

into Torbole at 2214 and the rest of the battalion followed. The 1st Battalion was just short of

Nago. At 0055 the Germans launched determined counterattacks on both positions. The attacks

were made by armor and supporting infantry. At 0125, General HAYS ordered Colonel COOK to

pull his troops out of Torbole onto the high ground to the east. Colonel COOK and Colonel HAY

were of the opinion that the battalions could hold their ground. They suggested a delay in withdrawal,

and General HAYS approved.

The 2nd Battalion, in reserve, had been en route to the high ground east of Torbole. Colonel

COOK ordered their bazookas sent forward and the remainder of the battalion to halt. By 0222,

the force of the attack seemed to be broken, though elements of the three rifle companies of the

3rd Battalion were still battling at least 3 tanks and an unknown number of infantry in the streets

of Torbole. The 1st Battalion had withdrawn to the high ground 1700 meters south of the objective,

but they were holding at that point. Artillery continued to rain on the enemy. Artillery was

sent into Torbole by DUKWs, and the wounded were evacuated in the same manner.

By 0900 the next morning the German artillery was beginning to constitute a real menace to

the troops in Torbole and to the 2nd Battalion, now in the vicinity of A578023. Air OPs were sent

up to find the gun positions.

The 1st Battalion finally occupied Nago at 1115 that morning. They had fought one of the

most discouraging and difficult actions of the entire campaign. For 14 straight hours on the 29th,

they had climbed up sheer cliffs, through ravines, and over slippery shale slopes. Finally at 1700

Apr 30

46

they had reached a high point from which they could see Nago. The only approach to the village

was through a small cut in the rocks. The Germans had a strong final protective line, a 20 mm

gun, a 37 mm ack-ack gun, one tank, and self-propelled guns. Not a man in the battalion believed

they could advance through that cut. When night came, though every man was so tired

that he could hardly stand, the battalion moved forward.

After a 15-minute artillery barrage, Company B moved through the ravine single-file. As the

column wound its way over the rocks, a German plane dipped low and dropped eight personnel

bombs on the weapons platoon, killing nine men, including 1st Lieutenant JOHN K. RANCK.

The men were beaten physically and the air bombardment was the last straw. They were then

approximately 200 yards from the town. They withdrew 500 yards at 0300. They spent the rest

of the cold and miserable night in the hills under constant rain of shellfire. Next morning, a patrol

from Company C made its way into Nago. The Germans had withdrawn during the night.

As Company B moved into the town, a German armored vehicle sped down the street. Pfc.

JOHN J. TRACEY and Pfc. EDGAR HENDERSON let go bursts of submachine gun fire and the

car skidded to a stop. Out of the car and into the ditch jumped four German officers. A minute

later, two of them were dead and two were prisoners.

With the back of the German resistance broken, the 2nd Battalion moved quickly into Riva.

By 1420 they had occupied the town. The regimental CP moved into Torbole.

By 1750 that night, the situation was fairly quiet. At the CP in Torbole, Colonel DARBY, assistant

divisional commander, talked with Colonel COOK. They stood on a stone walk near the

edge of the lake. Near them were Lieutenant JAMES H. MCLELLAN and Master Sergeant JOHN

T. EVANS, regimental Sergeant Major. A German shell exploded in the air above them. Sergeant

EVANS was instantly killed. Colonel DARBY, mortally wounded, walked inside the CP, and

died 45 minutes later. Both Colonel COOK and Lieutenant MCLELLAN were wounded, though

only Lieutenant MCLELLAN was evacuated.

At 2115 the CP displaced forward to Riva. The battalions were consolidating in Riva and

Torbole, expecting a well-earned rest. Rumors of peace and the end of the war were afoot, but no

one took them seriously except the Italians. The 86th confidently expected to have to chase the

Germans through the Brenner Pass. If Riva and Torbole were examples of the resistance they

would face, they did not look forward to the job.

47

ay was the victory month—for the 86th Mountain Infantry, for the 10th Mountain Division,

and for all the Allied forces in Italy and in Europe. By the first of the month the tired troops

of Lt. Col. ROBERT L. COOK’s command, resting for the moment after the bloody battles in

Nago, Torbole, and the Lake Garda tunnels, were beginning to listen more closely and even a bit

hopefully to the rumors of peace and surrender that persistently circulated. Most of the rumors

seemed to begin with the Italians. At first the GIs had ignored them; now they shrugged their

shoulders and muttered “Maybe—but I’ll believe it when I hear it myself on the radio, or better

still, when I see the Jerries quitting.”

Major HAROLD A. GREEN’s 1st Battalion, badly scarred from that tragic night of April 29 on

the rock slopes above Nago, was now bivouacked in that town. Captain JACK D. CARPENTER

had moved his 2nd Battalion companies into Riva (A549042) where the regimental command

post was also located. Around Riva to the north, in the little Alpine villages, the 3rd Battalion

kept a watchful eye on the mountains where the Germans still lurked in unknown strength and

numbers. Captain EVERETT C. BAILEY, acting battalion commander, had his CP at San Alessandro

(A568045).

Shortly after noon on May 1, at 1240, General GEORGE P. HAYS, the division commander,

discussed the situation with Colonel COOK. He ordered the 86th to rest as much as possible during

the next four days, establishing roadblocks to the north and sending out patrols to determine

if the enemy had established any line of resistance to the front.

Armor—tank destroyers and tanks—were brought into Riva and Torbole in expectation of

coming action as fast as they could be amphibiously transported across Lake Garda. The Germans

had done their usual methodical job of destruction on the bridges and tunnels around the

lakeshore, and much of the road was still impassable. The 126th Engineers worked steadily to

repair the damage.

By late afternoon on May 1, it appeared that the Germans did not intend to let the 86th rest,

notwithstanding General HAYS’s orders. A Partisan leader from Arco (A575082), the northernmost

village in the valley above Lake Garda, reported that the Germans were massing to attack

and recapture the town, now held by the local Italian forces. He asked for artillery support as

well as an infantry detachment. His report bore out information that the regiment already had,

and Colonel COOK began preparations immediately for the moving of troops into Arco.

In Riva, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions were enjoying the colorful spectacle of a Partisan parade.

Dressed in civilian clothes and bright red caps captured from the Germans, with German and

Italian weapons of every description, the Italian patriots moved through the streets, singing spirited

marching songs. Just as the parade ended, Partisans brought in 10 more Germans captured

in the hills. In all, the Italians had taken 200 Germans and 22 Fascists in two days. They led men

from the 86th to a huge German warehouse, filled with gray-green turtleneck sweaters and German

blankets. Soldiers re-equipped themselves, making up for battle losses.

The regiment kept a close watch on Arco. At 1828 Colonel COOK ordered artillery fire on

Arco, and at 2030, the regimental observation post, maintained by the regimental intelligence and

reconnaissance platoon under Technical Sergeant WILLIAM IGLEHEART, reported automatic

fire within the village. By 0330 the next morning, Company L, commanded by 1st Lt. WILIAM C.

M

May 1

48

MCCLINTOCK, was moving toward Arco. Air cover for the approach march was requested, but

Fifth Army overruled the request, one of the first concrete hints that something strange was in the

wind. At 0910, when Company L had reached A572057, 1st Lt. FRANK B. FOSTER moved Company

F out in the direction of Albergo. By 0930, Company L was at A572067, and at 0955, its

leading elements moved into Arco without resistance. At 0955, two priests reported that American

artillery shells were landing in Vigne di Arco and that two civilians had been killed. Since no

Germans were now in that locality, the artillery liaison officer was notified to correct his fire.

Company F moved steadily forward without opposition. At 1010 they entered Via el Vira

(A545059). By 1031 the company was 1000 yards southwest of Tenno (A537082), and Lt. FOSTER

split his company in order to enter Albergo, Villa del Monte, and Tenno simultaneously. At 1055

the main body of troops entered Tenno. Company L had closed into Arco at 1015, searched the

town, and found no enemy. Company F passed quickly through Tenno, and by 1145, elements

were in Villa del Monte and Albergo. By 1300 the surrounding country had been combed fruitlessly

for Germans, and Lt. FOSTER reported his mission accomplished and the territory secured.

Lt. MCCLINTOCK in Arco had dispersed his men at A572085, A595093, and A607033 in defensive

positions. Two tank destroyers were sent into Albergo and one tank to Company L in Arco

to reinforce the infantrymen.

The advances into Albergo and Arco constituted the last offensive moves for the regiment in

the Italian campaign. The second concrete indication that peace was in the air (the first having

been the refusal of air support by Fifth Army) came at 1630, May 2, when General HAYS phoned

the order that if any German emissaries approached American lines with white flags, they were

not to be fired on, but were to be brought to Division immediately.

The climax of the day and of the five months the 86th had spent in Italy came quickly. At

1850, 1st Lt. STENNETT M. SHEPPARD, liaison officer, phoned the CP to state that an intercepted

British broadcast had announced the unconditional surrender of the German armies in

North Italy. Five minutes later, the British liaison officer from the 1125th Artillery relayed a report

that the war in North Italy was over, and at 1900 came official word from General DAVID

RUFFNER that the war was “finito” and that there was to be no further firing of weapons except

in defense against attack.

The church bells in Riva rang wildly. Word passed quickly from official sources by word of

mouth. The soldiers were, as a rule, undemonstrative. Some got wine and liquor, which the Italians

brought out of hiding for the first time since the German occupation. Many bars opened and

drinks were “on the house.” Partisans and a few Yanks fired their weapons into the air. Largely,

the men were sober about the news. They felt awkward, it seemed, and had little or nothing to

say. The Italians were the real revelers. They sang heartily, danced in the streets, and kissed one

another happily while American soldiers looked on. “We fought the war and they’re celebrating

the end of it,” remarked one.

Blackout regulations disappeared. Jeeps drove madly through the streets with their lights on.

Windows were thrown wide, and flares lit up the darkness.

“Now that we are finished here, I wonder what they will do with us?” was the question most

GIs were asking. Most guessed they would end up in the Pacific, though the rumors were already

starting that the 10th was headed back to the States to train at Camp Carson, Colorado.

The men were relieved that the war in Europe was over, but dreaded the thought of fighting the

Japs. Small groups of soldiers discussed the events of the last few days of the war, and remarked

somberly, “Too bad Joe was wounded or Jim was killed just a few days before the war ended

May 2

30

49

here.” And when two men met who had not seen one another for some time, they said, “Well,

the war’s over. We lived through it.”

Pfc. ALBERT Y. ENGBRETSON of the Medical Detachment smiled, “I didn’t believe it, but I

got inside before somebody shot my head off in their exuberance. I figured it was too close to the

end of the war to risk my neck.” Pfc. ABRAHAM SCHWARTZ of Company B said, “I was lying

around when all of a sudden we heard a hell of a lot of shouting and yelling. I grabbed my helmet,

my rifle, and ammo and ran out to the road towards my foxhole, thinking a counterattack

was coming. The officers said, ‘Don’t shoot anybody unless it’s self-defense.’ Couldn’t figure it

out until they told us the news.”

And there were the stories and experiences to be told and retold. One of the most interesting

concerned the capture of a German lieutenant general and eight members of his staff a few hours

before hostilities ended. Included in the group of six men who effected the capture were three

86th personnel clerks, T/5 HARVEY GETTINGER of the Medical Detachment, Corporal

GEORGE C. DURKOTA of Company H and T/4 JOHN A. SCHELL of Service Company. The

men were in Bardolino when Partisans asked them if they would help bring in a German general

and his staff whom the Partisans had surrounded in a house eight miles north of town. In a Partisan-

driven truck, the clerks set out, and found out that the general, one Hildebrandt, was quite

willing to surrender to any Fifth Army men.

The immediate problem presenting itself with the end of fighting was the quick disarmament

of the Partisans. Just 20 minutes after the end, at 1930, Division ordered all Partisans to turn in

their weapons. Col. COOK and Lt. Col. JOHN H. HAY, regimental executive officer, established

a city arsenal in Riva. The disarming was without incident.

The surrender of the German armies involved the difficult task of collecting the enemy soldiers

and their equipment and occupying the remainder of northern Italy. On May 3, Major

GREEN was ordered to move to and occupy the town of Rovereto (A708038) where two German

battalions were congregated. He was to take a small detachment. On May 4, Company C under

1st Lt. WALTER M. TREVOR moved into the town. Six roadblocks were arranged for the disarming

of the Partisans in that area, and the Germans were segregated under the control of their own

officers. There was no trouble.

Late on the night of May 3, Technical Sergeant WILLIAM IGLEHEART of I & R Platoon had

come back from a patrol to Bolzano, north of Riva, to report that the commanding general of the

German LI Mountain Corps wished to formally surrender his troops. At 1900, Major DONALD

C. ALLEN and Major DAVID A. PFAELZER left for Malveno to receive the capitulation.

At 0845, May 4, Colonel HAY moved north with the 3rd Battalion as a task force to clean up

the country up to the Austrian border. The battalion moved along Highway 9 and by nightfall

had reached A750250. Continuing the steady occupation of the German-held territory, Company

B moved into Trento (A7802320). The battalion continued to move slowly north, eventually settling

down near Resia (V347097) where it remained in quiet occupation until May 13, 1945.

The regiment quickly settled down to a garrison routine, almost as if they were back at a

training area in the States. Roadblocks had been pulled in on May 4, and only warning posts

were maintained around each bivouac area. Reveille and retreat formations were held. During

the day, regular training was carried on; in addition, German arms and ammunition were collected

into dumps. In Trento, Capt. KENNETH SIEGMAN’s Company B gathered all Germans in

two areas and quickly and quietly disarmed the Partisans of the city. Yanks picked up souvenirs,

most popular, of course, being Lugers and P-38 pistols.

May 3

30

May 4

30

50

On May 13 and 14, the regiment moved out of the Riva area toward the south. Their orders

were to concentrate near Ghedi (F090510) and Bendecino (F130575), about 40 kilometers south of

Brescia. There they were to receive and guard German prisoners and await further orders. The

move was complete by the night of the 14th. The entire regiment set up in tents in a bivouac in

the green flat fields near an abandoned German airport. Headquarters Company and CP were at

Bendecino; Service Company at Ghedi. The 1st Battalion was at Bendecino; the 2nd Battalion,

under Lt. Col. DURED E. TOWNSEND, who had returned to duty, set up at Tampello (F128581),

while the 3rd Battalion under Col. HAY, its old commander, was at Castenedolo (F130577). At

Riva, Colonel COOK had been promoted to full colonel, and the new executive officer was Lt.

Col. HENRY J. HAMPTON, formerly 1st Battalion commander, who had been wounded at Sassomolare

in March, but who now also returned to duty. On May 17, Major GREEN of the 1st Battalion

was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel.

The regiment held showdown inspections and turned in its winter equipment. From a captured

German warehouse, Special Service obtained and issued free to each man a bottle of fine

French champagne. When the distribution was finished, a good number of bottles remained.

Pfc. THOMAS DALEY, T/5 ARTHUR RILEY and T/4 CHARLES WELLBORN celebrated with

the remainder of the bottles in a midnight victory orgy, and paid the inevitable price the next

morning.

The men played softball and volleyball in the hot Po Valley sun. On everyone’s mind was

the thought that perhaps the next stop for the regiment was a port of embarkation.

If such were the plans, Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia disrupted them. His troops refused to

evacuate the area around Trieste, and on May 16 the regiment was alerted to move northeast to

Udine, in order to keep an eye on the Yugoslavs. A quartering party, headed by 1st Lt. ADNA G.

WILDE JR. of Headquarters Company, actually left, but was dramatically turned back before it

reached its destination by a liaison plane, which landed on the highway in front of the convoy.

Mail censorship, which had ceased soon after the end of the hostilities, was placed back in effect.

The move did not actually take place until May 19. In the meantime the regiment saw the

War Department motion picture, “Two Down and One to Go,” which explained the point system

of discharge. The point system meant little to most of the men of the 86th since few of the men

had sufficient points to think about discharge.

Headquarters Company sent an advance party to the new CP on May 19. The 1st Battalion

moved out in trucks, traveling 205 miles and stopping only for the night at Orzano (C410190).

The 2nd Battalion moved 187 miles to Cividale (C759625).

On May 20, the remainder of the regiment moved out of Bendecino, while the 1st and 2nd

Battalions continued their trip to the Yugoslavian border. The entire regiment settled first in

tents in the general area of Cave del Pradil (C672613), but soon moved into the village itself and

surrounding mountain hamlets.

The CP was opened in a magnificent hotel in Cave del Pradil at 2235, May 21. The 1st Battalion

was at Bretto di Sotto (C692570), the 2nd at Cave del Pradil, and the 3rd at Passo del Pradil

(C672613). For much of the regiment, the accommodations were more luxurious than anything

they had yet enjoyed in Italy, though some companies still remained in tents. The mountainous

terrain reminded many of Camp Hale, and veterans of the outfit were soon skiing and mountain

climbing in the surrounding peaks.

May 13

1313 30

May 19

1313 30

51

Yugoslavs were garrisoned in the same areas as the Americans. Both the Slavs and the

Americans carried their weapons, maintained roadblocks, and stood guard duty. But for the

most part the Yugoslavs seemed friendly and no serious incidents were reported. The Yugoslavs

revealed that their instructions were to maintain the closest and most cordial relations with both

Allied troops and Italian Partisans. The Americans contented themselves for the time being with

close observation of the situation and the guarantee of protection and evacuation of anyone

threatened with conscription by the Yugoslavs.

With the training program and a sports program in full swing, the month came to an end.

During the month, the regiment had seen six of its enlisted men given field commissions for their

performance during the Po Valley push, and many more men had received combat awards. The

regiment had received numerous commendations, and the men were satisfied that they had done

a good job. High in the mountains, the men were content to “sweat the war out,” at least until

the situation changed.

52

uring the period June 1 to June 30, 1945, the 86th Mountain Infantry Regiment, under the

command of Colonel ROBERT L. COOK, remained in its stationary occupational positions in

northeastern Italy, following a routine training program and keeping a close watch on the territory

recently in dispute with Marshal Tito’s Yugoslav forces..

Throughout the month, the regimental command post, together with Headquarters Company

and Service Company, operated from the little mining village of Cave del Pradil. The 1st Battalion,

commanded by Lt. Col. HAROLD A. GREEN, was at Bretto di Sotto; Lt. Col. DURED E.

TOWNSEND’s 2nd Battalion occupied Cave del Pradil; and the 3rd Battalion, led by Lt. Col.

JOHN H. HAY JR. was in Passo del Pradil.

Little occurred to break the routine of training and recreational programs. On June 3, Field

Marshall HAROLD D. ALEXANDER, Supreme Allied Commander of the Mediterranean Theater,

briefly reviewed units of the regiment. The following day, the regiment, now under the operational

control of II Corps, was alerted. Information had been received that the Yugoslavs had

moved a force of 3000 men into the disputed area. Guards were doubled. Major DAVID A.

PFAELZER, regimental S-2, received instructions from division to locate and reconnoiter all defensive

installations in the area occupied by the 86th. No trouble materialized, and at 1800, June

8, the alert was lifted.

The 2nd and 3rd Battalions switched areas on June 9, the 3rd moving into Cave del Pradil

and the 2nd into the vicinity of Pluzett (C664672). On June 16, the regimental Intelligence and

Reconnaissance Platoon, under the leadership of 2nd Lt. WILLIAM IGLEHEART, was sent into

the hills north of Cave del Pradil in a fruitless search for 100 SS troops reported to be hiding

there.

Effective June 25 at 2400, the 10th Mountain Division was detached from II Corps and placed

under the operational control of 13 Corps (British).

Throughout the month, numerous officers and enlisted men were transferred from their

regiment to other units in preparation for eventual discharge or reassignment under the point

system. The most important single change was the departure of Major DAVID A. PFAELZER, S-

2, who was succeeded on June 21 by Captain DONALD MARBURG. Captain ROBERT R.

KRUMM, formerly 1st Battalion S-3, became Intelligence and Education Officer, assistant S-3, in

place of Captain MARBURG. Captain SAMUEL J. RANDALL became regimental surgeon after

the departure of Major JOHN K. MENEELEY JR. First Lieutenant SPENCER L. WYATT, Special

Service Officer, became Division Special Service Officer. His place was taken first by Lt. ADNA

G. WILDE and then by 1st Lt. WALTER M. CHAPMAN.

At the end of the month, the regiment remained in its same general area, engaged in training

and an extensive educational and recreational program.

_____________________

On July 26, the 86th Regiment sailed from Livorno on the SS Westbrook Victory, arriving at

Newport News, VA on August 7. After a 30-day furlough, the men reported to Camp Carson,

Colorado. A copy of the 86th Regimental combat history was distributed to each member of the

regiment. The 10th Mountain Division was inactivated on November 30, 1945.

D

53

Major General George P. Hays, Division Commander

Brigadier General Robinson E. Duff, Asst. Division Commander

Wounded in action April 22

Colonel William O. Darby, Asst. Division Commander

Killed on action April 30

Brigadier General David L. Ruffner, Division Artillery

Colonel Clarence M. Tomlinson, Commander, wounded April 16

Colonel Robert M. Cook, April 16 to June 30

Lieutenant Colonel Henry H. Hampton, wounded March 4

Lieutenant Colonel Harold L. Green, March 5 to June 30

Lieutenant Colonel Dured Townsend, wounded April 17, returned May 13

Major John E. Seamans, April 17 to wounded April 29

Captain Jack D. Carpenter, April 29 to May 13

Lieutenant Colonel John H. Hay, to Regimental Executive Officer April 23,

returned to Battalion command May 2

Major William D. Drake, April 23 to wounded April 29

Captain Everett C. Bailey, April 29 to May 2

The 10th Mountain Division was part of IV Corps, which was commanded by Major General

Willis D. Crittenberger. IV Corps was part of the Fifth Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Lucian K.

Truscott.

54

he total number of men who fought in Italy in the 86th Mountain Infantry Regiment was

4,785. Of these, 1,770 (37%) were replacements who joined the regiment in Italy.

Total casualties in the 86th were 1,380: 246 killed in action or died of wounds incurred in action,

1128 wounded, and 6 taken prisoner of war.

The Italian campaign can be divided into nine phases. The table below identifies the phases

and the number of 86th Regiment casualties in each phase.

CAMPAIGN PHASE DATES KIA/DOW WIA POW TOTAL

1. Early Patrols Jan 6 - Feb 18 13 26 3 42

2. Riva Ridge Feb 18 – Feb 25 17 49 3 69

3. Mt. Belvedere Feb 19 - Mar 2 39 176 215

4. March Offensive Mar 3 - Mar 6 55 192 247

5. Consolidation Mar 7 - Apr 13 16 124 140

6. Spring Offensive Apr 14 - Apr 16 43 132 175

7. Breakout Apr 17 - Apr 20 22 159 181

8., Po Valley Apr 20 - Apr 26 14 78 92

9. Lake Garda Apr 26 - May 2 27 170 197

Unknown dates 22 22

TOTALS: 246 1128 6 1380

T

55

ROLL OF HONOR

86th MOUNTAIN INFANTRY REGIMENT

KIA/DOW DOW WIA

NAME RANK C O DATE DATE PLACE

STUART E ABBOTT PFC L 2/20/45 MT GORGOLESCO

STRATFORD G ALEX PFC K 2/24/45 MT DELLA TORRACCIA

WARREN S ANDERSON PFC K 2/24/45 MT DELLA TORRACCIA

ARTUR ARGIEWICZ JR SGT L 1/25/45 QUERCIOLA

JACK R AUSTIN PFC HQ 2ND 4/14/45 ROCCA DI ROFFENO

JAMES L BACON PVT I 2/25/45 MT DELLA TORRACCIA

PAUL G BAZZELL JR 2ND LT B 3/4/45 SASSOMOLARE

ARTHUR H BENTLEY T/5 B 4/23/45 PO VALLEY

RAYMOND W BLOOM PFC A 4/15/45 CEREGLIO

LESTER L BOADY JR PFC D 3/3/45 MONTEFORTE

PETER A BONTEMPO PFC F 4/14/45 TORRE IUSSI

RICHARD B BORDENAVE PFC K 2/24/45 MT DELLA TORRACCIA

MICHAEL G BOSTONIA PVT D 2/21/45 PIZZO DI CAMPIANO

RALPH R BROMAGHIN CAPT HQ 3RD 2/26/45 MT DELLA TORRACCIA

MARION W BROWN PFC B 2/22/45 PIZZO DI CAMPIANO

WAYNE S BROWN PFC K 2/24/45 MT DELLA TORRACCIA

RICHARD D BRUCKELMYER PFC E 4/17/45 MONTEPASTORE

CHARLES W BURBANK PVT I 4/18/45 SULMONTE

JOHN BURROWS PFC K 4/16/45 MT SETTE CROCI

J B BUXTON PFC E 4/28/45 NAVENE

ARCHIE C CALHOON PFC A 3/4/45 SASSOMOLARE

DONALD W CALLAHAN PFC M 5/4/45 4/30/45 TORBOLE

THEODORE J CAMIRE PFC E 4/17/45 MONTEPASTORE

MICHAEL P CARBILLANO PFC E 4/14/45 ROCCA DI ROFFENO

OSCAR C CAREY PVT A 3/30/45 CASTEL D'AIANO

PAUL CARR 2ND LT E 4/15/45 CEREGLIO

CONRAD F CARROLL PFC G 3/3/45 C ROMITO

WALTER T CASCELLA PFC B 4/29/45 NAGO

CARL E CASPERSON S/SGT B 2/22/45 PIZZO DI CAMPIANO

RUSSEL H CAVANAUGH S/SGT C 3/13/45 MT GRANDE D'AIANO

RICHARD A CEREPA PFC A 3/4/45 SASSOMOLARE

ALEXANDER L CHERKASSKY PFC HQ 4/24/45 PO VALLEY

FRANK B CHRISTENSEN PFC I 4/17/45 MT NONASCOSO

NICHOLAS D CLAINOS 2ND LT C 3/4/45 SASSOMOLARE

JOSEPH O CLARK PVT B 3/7/45 3/6/45 SASSO BALDINO

IRVIN W CLEMENS T/5 L 4/29/45 4/19/45 C PELI

JOEL S COFFIN III S/SGT E 3/3/45 IOLA

JACK R COLBY PFC F 3/4/45 TAMBURINI

JOHN P COMPTON PFC G 3/3/45 C ROMITO

RICHARD L CRANDALL PFC G 3/3/45 C ROMITO

ROBERT J CRONIN PFC L 3/5/45 CAMPO DEL SOLE

ROY E CRUM T/4 SVC 4/16/45 MONZUNO

LLOYD E CRUMBLEY SGT F 4/14/45 TORRE IUSSI

PROSPERO M CUCCI SGT I 2/25/45 MT DELLA TORRACCIA

JOSEPH CUOCO S/SGT F 4/14/45 TORRE IUSSI

JOHN A DARROW SGT E 3/3/45 MT TERMINALE

MORGAN V DESMOND T/SGT C 2/20/45 MT SERRASICCIA

EDWARD H DIGITALE PFC B 2/22/45 PIZZO DI CAMPIANO

WILLIAM J DMYTROW PFC G 4/15/45 CEREGLIO

56

KIA/DOW DOW WIA

NAME RANK C O DATE DATE PLACE

JAMES B DONAHUE PVT G 4/15/45 CEREGLIO

THOMAS C DULLEN PVT HQ 1ST 4/23/45 S BENEDETTO PO

JOSEPH P DUSKEY JR S/SGT E 3/3/45 MT TERMINALE

MERLE E EASLEY PFC G 3/3/45 C ROMITO

JOHN M EDMINSTEN PFC I 2/25/45 MT DELLA TORRACCIA

LAWRENCE B ELY CAPT H 4/29/45 TORBOLE

EDWARD H ENNERS III PFC L 2/20/45 MT GORGOLESCO

JAMES D ENRIGHT III SGT H 4/29/45 TORBOLE

DAN ESPINOSA PVT K 2/20/45 MT GORGOLESCO

JOHN T EVANS SGT MAJ SVC 4/30/45 TORBOLE

FRANK R EVERINGHAM SGT I 4/28/45 NAVENE

WOODROW A FAIRCLOTH T/SGT B 4/16/45 LA COSTA

KARL I FARGUS PVT B 4/29/45 NAGO

MATTHEW W FEITH PVT B 4/29/45 NAGO

JOE S FISHER PVT B 4/29/45 NAGO

ROBERT P FISHER SGT F 4/14/45 TORRE IUSSI

LUTHER O FLANNERY PVT M 2/25/45 MT DELLA TORRACCIA

CLAUDE S FORD T/SGT K 4/30/45 TORBOLE

JAMES C FORD JR PFC E 3/3/45 MT TERMINALE

JOSEPH C FOSTER PVT MED 1/6/45 QUERCIANELLA

RIDGWAY FOUST CAPT G 4/17/45 MONTEPASTORE

ROY A FOWLER PFC L 2/20/45 MT GORGOLESCO

AARON G FREEMAN PFC G 4/14/45 ROCCO DI ROFFENO

QUINNON V FREUDENRICH PFC E 4/14/45 ROCCA DI ROFFENO

SANGREE M FROELICHER S/SGT B 3/4/45 SASSOMOLARE

GEORGE W FULLER PFC F 1/6/45 QUERCIANELLA

MAYNARD A FULLER S/SGT I 4/29/45 TORBOLE

GUILLERMO N GARCIA PVT K 4/17/45 SULMONTE

HERIBERTO GARCIA PFC SVC 4/18/45 SULMONTE

JESUS G GARCIA PFC L 2/20/45 MT GORGOLESCO

LEWIS F GARRISON T/4 B 4/16/45 LA COSTA

CARL F GIBSON PFC K 2/25/45 MT DELLA TORRACCIA

ALFRED E GILLERAN SGT K 3/24/45 SASSO BALDINO

CHARLES J GILLICK PVT I 2/25/45 MT DELLA TORRACCIA

WILLIAM G GODWIN PFC A 2/19/45 PIZZO DI CAMPIANO

ANDREW A GOLDSTEIN PFC MED 3/4/45 SASSOMOLARE

BENJAMIN R GOOD PFC B 2/21/45 PIZZO DI CAMPIANO

EUGENE A GOODWIN PVT G 3/3/45 C ROMITO

ROBERT L GORDON 2ND LT K 4/16/45 MT SETTE CROCI

DELMAR GRAHAM PFC G 4/15/45 CEREGLIO

THEODORE S GREENE 2ND LT I 3/5/45 CAMPO DEL SOLE

CHARLES E GREGORY PFC L 4/18/45 BADIA

EVERETT R GRIFFIN PFC A 3/3/45 MT TERMINALE

ALBERT R GRUNDTNER PFC L 3/3/45 CAMPO DEL SOLE

CLAYTON E GUNTER PFC I 2/25/45 MT DELLA TORRACCIA

CLARENCE J HAGEN 1ST LT (CHPL) SVC 1/6/45 QUERCIANELLA

HOBLE HALCOMB PFC K 4/21/45 CASONI

HAROLD J HALL T/SGT B 1/21/45 ROCCA CORNETA

HERBERT V HARDY SGT M 2/24/45 MT DELLA TORRACCIA

WILLIAM S HAUGHABOO SGT B 4/29/45 NAGO

HENRY W HENGEN PFC C 3/4/45 SASSOMOLARE

JACK J HERTNEKY JR PFC L 3/5/45 CAMPO DEL SOLE

MCKINLEY HILL PVT H 3/3/45 MT TERMINALE

ELTON L HOOPER PFC H 4/15/45 CEREGLIO

57

KIA/DOW DOW WIA

NAME RANK C O DATE DATE PLACE

THOMAS H HOWELL JR 2ND LT K 2/24/45 MT DELLA TORRACCIA

KENNETH M HUSBAND PFC E 3/31/45 SASSO BALDINO

HAROLD L HYATT JR PFC F 5/21/45 4/14/45 TORRE IUSSI

WILLIAM R JACK S/SGT I 4/18/45 SULMONTE

ROBERT W JACOBI PFC B 4/22/45 S BENEDETTO PO

GLEN C JOHNSON PFC H 4/14/45 ROCCA DI ROFFENO

STEVE KATRUSKA PFC L 3/3/45 CAMPO DEL SOLE

STEENY L KOON PFC C 3/11/45 MT GRANDE D'AIANO

NORMAN KOVACH PFC B 2/22/45 PIZZO DI CAMPIANO

ARCHIE F KUHN PFC L 2/20/45 MT GORGOLESCO

ROBERT L KUHNERT S/SGT I 4/17/45 LE PRADOLE

CHARLES D LADD T/5 MED 4/29/45 TORBOLE

RAYMOND G LADUE PFC G 3/3/45 C ROMITO

JOHN W LARRABEE PFC G 3/3/45 C ROMITO

FERDINAND LEBRECHT PFC C 2/20/45 MT SERRASICCIA

MICHAEL A LEFAND PFC F 4/14/45 TORRE IUSSI

JOSEPH M LENTINI SGT D 3/3/45 MONTEFORTE

RALPH T LETO PFC L 4/18/45 BADIA

MARVIN E LIEGEY PVT H 4/18/45 4/14/45 ROFFENO MUSIOLO

ELBERT LIGON JR PVT I 4/28/45 NAVENE

JAMES V LITTLE SGT HQ 1ST 4/20/45 PONTE SAMOGGIA

CECILIO LOPEZ PFC K 3/20/45 SASSO BALDINO

HOWELL H LOWERY PFC C 3/4/45 SASSOMOLARE

JAMES E LUEDTKE PFC I 2/25/45 MT DELLA TORRACCIA

GILBERT J MADSEN PFC G 3/3/45 C ROMITO

CHARLES D MALLICO PVT C 3/4/45 SASSOMOLARE

HARRY MALONAS PVT MED 1/6/45 QUERCIANELLA

ALBERT MARROCCO PFC I 4/18/45 SULMONTE

JOHN D MARTIN PFC F 4/14/45 TORRE IUSSI

FRED A MARTINO S/SGT C 2/20/45 MT SERRASICCIA

LEO P MASONIS PFC B 4/22/45 S BENEDETTO PO

JAMES A MATTHEWS S/SGT HQ 1ST 3/7/45 SASSO BALDINO

JOHN A MCCOWN II 1ST LT C 2/20/45 MT SERRASICCIA

RICHARD G MCGUIRE PFC B 4/29/45 NAGO

LEON J MERMET PFC A 2/20/45 PIZZO DI CAMPIANO

JOHN C MINTURN III 2ND LT I 4/18/45 SULMONTE

WILLIAM R MITCHELL JR S/SGT K 2/20/45 MT GORGOLESCO

ROBERT T MIX PFC E 3/31/45 SASSO BALDINO

MURL MONTGOMERY PFC F 4/14/45 TORRE IUSSI

JOHN S MOORE PFC K 2/20/45 MT GORGOLESCO

ROY T MOORE PFC HQ 2ND 3/16/45 CASTEL D'AIANO

ROBERT F MORALES PFC L 4/19/45 4/16/45 MONZUNO

ROBERT H MORROW PVT I 4/17/45 LE PRADOLE

RICHARD D MOSEY PFC M 4/20/45 SAN LORENZO

HERMAN F MUELLER PFC B 4/29/45 NAGO

BERNARD J MURPHY PFC E 4/15/45 ROCCA DI ROFFENO

MELVIN H NAIMAN PFC H 4/15/45 CEREGLIO

ROBERT NAYLOR PFC MED 2/24/45 MT DELLA TORRACCIA

CHARLES G NORTON PFC B 1/19/45 ROCCA CORNETA

HERSHELL E NORTON PFC HQ 3RD 2/24/45 MT DELLA TORRACCIA

KENNETH J NYPAVER S/SGT K 4/21/45 CASONI

OSCAR P ODDEN T/4 E 4/14/45 ROCCA DI ROFFENO

LEON ORSINI T/4 E 4/19/45 4/18/45 C CORNETTI

JAMES H PARFITT T/4 MED 4/21/45 4/20/45 PO VALLEY

58

KIA/DOW DOW WIA

NAME RANK C O DATE DATE PLACE

JAMES C PARKER PFC L 4/22/45 4/17/45 MT NONASCOSO

THOMAS J PATTI PFC L 2/20/45 MT GORGOLESCO

MYRON F PEABODY PFC G 4/4/45 SASSOMOLARE

JOHN E PENNEBAKER PFC B 4/29/45 NAGO

DAVID PEREZ PFC B 4/29/45 NAGO

NED O PETERSON PFC L 2/20/45 MT GORGOLESCO

CHARLES R PHIPPS PFC G 3/3/45 C ROMITO

ROBERT H PIRO CPL B 2/22/45 PIZZO DI CAMPIANO

CHARLES J PLATTEN PFC C 3/4/45 SASSOMOLARE

JOHN S PODBORNY PVT L 2/20/45 MT GORGOLESCO

MAX POSTERNAK PFC E 4/15/45 AMORE

FRED L POYNOR PFC F 4/15/45 4/14/45 TORRE IUSSI

RAYMOND E RABE PFC K 4/21/45 CASONI

PEDRO M RAMIREZ S/SGT K 4/21/45 CASONI

JOHN K RANCK 1ST LT B 4/29/45 NAGO

DOUGLAS L RAND SGT B 3/4/45 SASSOMOLARE

RICHARD C REED PFC B 4/16/45 LA COSTA

WENDELL F REICK PFC L 2/20/45 MT BELVEDERE

ROBERT L REID PVT A 3/4/45 SASSOMOLARE

HENRY REISS PFC L 2/20/45 MT GORGOLESCO

NEAL M RICHARDSON PFC A 4/30/45 NAGO

ALFRED RICKEN SGT I 2/25/45 MT DELLA TORRACCIA

JAMES E RIDDLE PVT B 3/4/45 SASSOMOLARE

GERALD E RIEDELL PVT B 3/4/45 SASSOMOLARE

ALBERT C RIETMAN PFC C 3/4/45 SASSOMOLARE

ROSARIO D D ROBERGE PFC B 1/21/45 ROCCA CORNETA

HOWARD E ROBERTS PFC I 4/29/45 TORBOLE

MERLE H ROBINSON PFC D 3/4/45 SASSOMOLARE

FAUSTO RODRIGUEZ PFC C 3/4/45 SASSOMOLARE

RICHARD A ROGERS 2ND LT M 4/29/45 TORBOLE

ROBERT G RUHLMAN PFC L 2/20/45 MT GORGOLESCO

VICTOR E RUSH PFC M 4/20/45 S LORENZO

WILLIAM A RYAN PFC B 1/21/45 ROCCA CORNETA

JOHN W SANWALD PFC I 2/25/45 MT DELLA TORRACCIA

MICHAEL SBARDELLA PFC B 4/29/45 NAGO

WILLIAM J SCHILL PFC E 4/15/45 CEREGLIO

WILLIAM SCHREIBER 2ND LT I 4/18/45 SULMONTE

ARVIL T SELLERS PFC I 4/18/45 SULMONTE

AL F SHAFER PFC C 2/20/45 MT SERRASICCIA

MARION L SHAFFER PFC MED 4/19/45 BORTOLANI

JAMES H SHELBY SGT G 4/15/45 CEREGLIO

HARRY M SHEPPARD SGT B 4/29/45 NAGO

FELIX A SHERMAN T/SGT F 3/12/45 CASTEL D'AIANO

DONALD G SIMPSON PVT G 4/15/45 CEREGLIO

EDWARD E SMITH JR S/SGT E 4/14/45 ROCCA DI ROFFENO

ROBERT G SMITH PFC D 3/3/45 MONTEFORTE

JOHN SOBOCINSKI PFC E 3/27/45 SASSO BALDINO

ROBERT L SORENSEN PFC I 4/18/45 SULMONTE

EDWARD F SPIEWAK PFC B 2/21/45 PIZZO DI CAMPIANO

RICHARD J STAGE PFC F 3/12/45 CASTEL D'AIANO

LEO S STASKO T/3 MED 2/24/45 2/23/45 MT DELLA TORRACCIA

EARL W STAUB PFC E 3/3/45 MT TERMINALE

MELVIN C STEELE CPL D 4/21/45 BOMPORTO

HORACE A STERN SGT I 2/25/45 MT DELLA TORRACCIA

59

KIA/DOW DOW WIA

NAME RANK C O DATE DATE PLACE

JOSEPH STERN PFC H 4/14/45 ROCCA DI ROFFENO

DARWIN H STONEROAD T/5 SVC 4/19/45 BADIA

WILLIAM H STRICKLER S/SGT C 3/4/45 SASSOMOLARE

JAMES J STROBEL PFC L 3/4/45 CAMPO DEL SOLE

HOWARD E STROHM CPL H 4/29/45 TORBOLE

HORACE L SULLIVAN S/SGT L 4/16/45 MONZUNO

ALVIE A SWEARENGIN PVT D 2/21/45 PIZZO DI CAMPIANO

ROBERT D THOMAS PFC I 2/26/45 MT DELLA TORRACCIA

ARNIE L THOMPSON PFC F 3/3/45 MT TERMINALE

MAGNUS O THUNESS PFC C 3/6/45 SASSOMOLARE

RICHARD P TICKELL JR 2ND LT F 4/14/45 TORRE IUSSI

TORGER D TOKLE T/SGT A 3/3/45 IOLA

ARTHUR K TOKOLA SGT A 3/3/45 IOLA

WILLIAM H TRESSLER PFC F 4/15/45 TORRE IUSSI

JACK E TREW SGT L 2/20/45 MT GORGOLESCO

UNKNOWN 1 PVT HQ 2ND 3/12/45 MADNA DI BRASA

UNKNOWN 2 PVT HQ 2ND 3/12/45 MADNA DI BRASA

GREGORIE S VACCARINO PFC G 3/3/45 C ROMITO

CHARLES J VADEBONCOEUR T/SGT F 1/10/45 1/6/45 QUERCIANELLA

LESTER L VALENTINE T/5 L 4/16/45 MONZUNO

NICHOLAS M VLASOFF PFC G 4/15/45 CEREGLIO

WILLIAM U WALTER T/5 MED 1/6/45 QUERCIANELLA

HENRY T WARD PVT F 1/6/45 QUERCIANELLA

ORVILLE L WEBB 1ST SGT I 3/25/45 MT GRANDE D'AIANO

LOUIS C WESLEY SGT L 3/2/45 MT DELLA TORRACCIA

LAWRENCE A WHITE SGT D 3/3/45 MONTEFORTE

LEROY WHITING PFC B 3/4/45 SASSOMOLARE

JERRY WIEDER PVT F 3/4/45 TAMBURINI

JEAN A WILCOX PFC I 2/25/45 MT DELLA TORRACCIA

JAMES O WILKINS T/3 MED 1/6/45 QUERCIANELLA

DWIGHT C WILLIAMS SGT B 4/30/45 NAGO

NILLO A WIRKKALA PFC B 2/22/45 PIZZO DI CAMPIANO

ALEXANDER T WRIGHT PFC H 4/15/45 CEREGLIO

LYLE E WYCKOFF PVT I 3/5/45 CAMPO DEL SOLE

JOHN J YAMMARINO JR PFC A 3/5/45 MT GRANDE D'AIANO

60

61

MAP 1. RIVA RIDGE

February 18 - 25

62

63

MAP 2. MT. BELVEDERE RIDGE

February 19 – March 2

64

65

MAP 3. MARCH OFFENSIVE

March 3 – March 6

66

67

MAP 4. SPRING OFFENSIVE

April 14 – 16

68

69

MAP 5. BREAKOUT

April 17 - 20

70

71

MAP 6. PO VALLEY SOUTH

April 20 – 22

72

73

MAP 7. PO RIVER CROSSING

April 23 – 24

74

75

MAP 8. ADVANCE TO LAKE GARDA

April 25 – 29

76

77

MAP 9. LAKE GARDA: THE FINAL BATTLES

April 28 – May 2